Professor J Adam Carter

  • Professor of Philosophy (Philosophy)

email: Adam.Carter@glasgow.ac.uk

Room 403 Level 4, Philosophy, 67-69 Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8LP

Import to contacts

ORCID iDhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1222-8331

Biography

Personal website: https://www.jadamcarter.com

 

 

Research interests

Adam's research is mainly in epistemology with particular focus on the following issues: virtue epistemology (especially performance-theoretic virtue epistemology); know-how; cognitive ability; intentional action; relativism; social epistemology; epistemic luck; epistemic value; group knowledge; understanding; and epistemic defeat. His books include Metaepistemology and Relativism (Palgrave MacMillan 2016), A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How (Bloomsbury 2018, with Ted Poston), The Philosophy of Group Polarization (Routledge, 2021, with Fernando Broncano-Berrocal), This is Epistemology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2021, with Clayton Littlejohn), Digital Knowledge (Routledge, forthcoming), Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing (Oxford University Press, 2022), and Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence (Cambridge University Press, Epistemology Elements, forthcoming).

Adam's latest monograph, A Telic Theory of Trust, is now under contract (as of 2022) with Oxford University Press, and is tied to his 2020-2023 Leverhulme research grant A Virtue Epistemology of Trust (PI) which supported this work. Upcoming planned book projects include two monographs that will be tied to two separate AHRC research projects set to begin in September 2022. One (co-authored with Jesper Kallestrup) will be on epistemic anti-individualism and virtue epistemology, the other (co-authored with Neil Levy) will be on scaffolded autonomy.

Separate to this, Adam is working on a project connecting knowledge-that, knowledge-how, and intentional action, with a focus on understanding how underlying cognitive dispositions relate to all three, and how all three relate to each other. 

For links to published and forthcoming papers, as well as works in progress, see here.

 

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008
Number of items: 172.

2024

Carter, J. A. and Kearl, T. (2024) Knowing How and Learning How: An Epistemic Theory of Control. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2024) Abduction, skepticism, and indirect realism. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02206-7) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Andrada, G. (2024) Intentional action, knowledge, and cognitive extension. Synthese, 204, 67. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-024-04691-z)

Titus, L. M. and Carter, J. A. (2024) What the tortoise should do: a knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation. Noûs, 58(2), pp. 456-481. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12460)

Carter, J. A. and Navarro, J. (2024) Fake knowledge-how. Philosophical Quarterly, (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqae049) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Cowan, R. (2024) Safety and dream scepticism in Sosa’s epistemology. Synthese, 203, 180. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-024-04577-0)

Carter, J. A. (2024) A Telic Theory of Trust. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192888969 (doi: 10.1093/9780191982460.001.0001)

Kearl, T. and Carter, J. A. (2024) Easy practical knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Piedrahita, O. and Carter, J. A. (2024) Can AI believe? Philosophy and Technology, 37, 89. (doi: 10.1007/s13347-024-00780-6)

Carter, J. A. (2024) Knowledge norms and conversation. In: Silva Filho, W. J. (ed.) Epistemology of Conversation. Springer: Dordrecht. (Accepted for Publication)

Pickel, B. and Carter, J. A. (2024) Frege on the tolerability of sense variation: a reply to Michaelson and Textor. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

2023

Carter, J. A. (2023) Trust and trustworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107(2), pp. 377-394. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12918)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Understanding, vulnerability and risk. In: González-Castán, Ó.L. (ed.) Cognitive Vulnerability: An Epistemological Approach. Series: Berlin studies in knowledge research, 18. De Gruyter: Berlin, pp. 177-192. ISBN 9783110799163 (doi: 10.1515/9783110799163-011)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Simion and Kelp on trustworthy AI. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 18. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00067-1)

Shepherd, J. and Carter, J. A. (2023) Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action. Ergo, 9, pp. 556-583. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.2277)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2023) Epistemology in the Subpersonal Vale. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Shepherd, J. (2023) Intentional action and knowledge-centred theories of control. Philosophical Studies, 180(3), pp. 957-977. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01904-4)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Analysis of knowledge. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. 3rd Edition. Wiley. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2023) Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 55(3), pp. 290-300. (doi: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2037418)

Carter, J. A. and Ichikawa, J. J. (2023) Intuitions. In: Oxford Bibliographies Online. Oxford University Press. (In Press)

2022

Carter, J. A. (2022) Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence. Series: Epistemology Elements. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 44. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00045-z)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Trust as performance. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), pp. 120-147. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12214)

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Reply to critics: collective (telic) virtue epistemology. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 363-366. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-48)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Reply to Gardiner on virtues of attention. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 73-76. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-8)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Reply to Watson on the social virtue of questioning. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 442-444. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-58)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals. In: Sosa, E., Steup, M., Turri, J. and Roeber, B. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Therapeutic trust. Philosophical Psychology, (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2058925) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology. Philosophical Review, 131(2), pp. 235-240. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-9554769)[Book Review]

Miracchi, L. and Carter, J. A. (2022) Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory. Synthese, 200, pp. 1-28. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03462-y)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing. Oxford University Press: Oxford ; New York. ISBN 9780192846921 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780192846921.001.0001)

Carter, J. A. and Sosa, E. (2022) Metaepistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

2021

Alfano, M., Fard, A. E., Carter, J. A. , Clutton, P. and Klein, C. (2021) Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube’s recommender system. Synthese, 199(1-2), pp. 835-858. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02724-x)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. and Grodniewicz, J.P. (2021) Understanding a communicated thought. Synthese, 198(12), pp. 12137-12151. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02854-2)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Archimedean metanorms. Topoi, 40(5), pp. 1075-1085. (doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9586-9)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-5)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2021) Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology. Erkenntnis, 86(5), pp. 1139-1159. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2021) Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. Synthese, 198(10), pp. 9243-9272. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02631-1)

Carter, J. A. , Dechauffour, G. and Lefftz, G. (2021) Introduction to Special Issue: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3517-3519. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03241-1)

Kotzee, B., Carter, J. A. and Siegel, H. (2021) Educating for intellectual virtue: a critique from action guidance. Episteme, 18(2), pp. 177-199. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.10)

Littlejohn, C. and Carter, J. A. (2021) This is Epistemology: An Introduction. Series: This is philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell: Hoboken, NJ. ISBN 9781118336823

Carter, J. A. (2021) Politics, deep disagreement, and relativism. In: Hannon, M. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9780367345907

Carter, J. A. (2021) Exercising abilities. Synthese, 198(3), pp. 2495-2509. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02227-4)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Digital Knowledge. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2021) The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY ; Abingdon, Oxon. ISBN 9780367901011 (doi: 10.4324/9781003023654)

Baghramian, M., Carter, J. A. and Rowland, R. (Eds.) (2021) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2021) De Minimis Normativism: a new theory of full aptness. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(1), pp. 16-36. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa017)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Trust and its significance in social epistemology. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (In Press)

2020

Carter, J. A. (2020) Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5117-5136. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1181-2)

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2020) Varieties of cognitive integration. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 867-890. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12288)

Carter, J. A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (Eds.) (2020) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9780367077426

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2020) The epistemology of group disagreement: an introduction. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 1-8. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-1)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2020) Deliberation and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 9-45. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-2)

Carter, J. A. (2020) On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. Philosophical Studies, 177, pp. 2299-2322. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2020) Skepticism motivated: on the skeptical import of motivated reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(6), pp. 702-718. (doi: 10.1017/can.2020.16)

Heersmink, R. and Carter, J. A. (2020) The philosophy of memory technologies: metaphysics, knowledge, and values. Memory Studies, 13(4), pp. 416-433. (doi: 10.1177/1750698017703810)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2020) Intellectual humility and assertion. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Series: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. Routledge: Oxon, UK, pp. 335-345. ISBN 9780815364115

Carter, J. A. (2020) Collective (telic) virtue epistemology. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge: London. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. (2020) Is searching the internet making us intellectually arrogant? In: Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. P. (eds.) Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge, pp. 88-103. ISBN 9780367260859 (doi: 10.4324/9780429291395-9)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2937-2961. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1549-y)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Epistemic autonomy and externalism. In: Lougheed, K. and Matheson, J. (eds.) Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge: London, UK. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Varieties of (extended) thought manipulation. In: Blitz, M. and Bublitz, C. (eds.) The Future of Freedom of Thought: Liberty, Technology, and Neuroscience. Palgrave Macmillan. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Koch, A.-K. (2020) Epistemic pluralism. In: Harris, P., Bitoni, A., Fleisher, C.S. and Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. (eds.) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783030445553 (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2020) Special Issue of Synthese: Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives [Guest Editors]. Springer. ISBN 0039-7857

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2020) Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives. Synthese, 197(6), pp. 2291-2294. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02662-8)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(2), 449-466-449-466. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem. Philosophical Studies, 177(5), pp. 1229-1254. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x)

Carter, J. A. and Mortini, D. (2020) Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York. ISBN 9780367343200

Carter, J. A. and Simion, M. (2020) The ethics and epistemology of trust. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

2019

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) The superstitious lawyer's inference. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) Well-founded belief: an introduction. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Relativism and externalism. In: Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge: London. ISBN 9781138484283

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. Synthese, 196(12), pp. 4989-5007. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8)

Carter, J. A. , Pritchard, D. and Shepherd, J. (2019) Knowledge-how, understanding-why, and epistemic luck: an experimental study. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4), pp. 701-734. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9)

Carter, J. A. , Leffetz, G. and Dechauffour, G. (Eds.) (2019) Special Issue of Synthese: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst [Guest Editors]. Springer. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2019) Vices of distrust. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10), pp. 25-32.

Carter, J. A. (2019) Radical scepticism and the epistemology of confusion. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 9(3), pp. 223-237. (doi: 10.1163/22105700-20191387)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Autonomy, cognitive offloading and education. Educational Theory, 68(6), pp. 657-673. (doi: 10.1111/edth.12338)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2019) The epistemology of cognitive enhancement. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 220-242. (doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhy040) (PMID:30877778)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Epistemic luck and the extended mind. In: Church, I. M. and Hartman, R. J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 318-319. ISBN 9780815366591

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (Eds.) (2019) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A. (2019) Virtue perspectivism, externalism, and epistemic circularity. In: Crețu, A.-M. and Massimi, M. (eds.) Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Series: Synthese library (Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science), 416. Springer: Cham, pp. 123-140. ISBN 9783030270407 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_8)

2018

Carter, J. A. (2018) On behalf of controversial view agnosticism. European Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), pp. 1358-1370. (doi: 10.1111/ejop.12333)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2018) Extended self-knowledge. In: Pedrini, P. and Kirsch, J. (eds.) Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Series: Contributions to phenomenology (96). Springer: Cham, pp. 31-49. ISBN 9783319986449 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_3)

Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198801764

Carter, J. A. (2018) Meta-epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195(7), pp. 2877-2896. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9)

Carter, J. A. and McDonnell, N. (2018) Welcome to the machine. Philosophers' Magazine, 81, pp. 33-39. (doi: 10.5840/tpm20188144)

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A. and Palermos, S. O. (2018) New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 331-351. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2018) Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 42-63. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. (2018) Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control. Metaphilosophy, 49(3), pp. 283-304. (doi: 10.1111/meta.12304)

Pritchard, D., Carter, J. A. and Turri, J. (2018) The value of knowledge. In: Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Stanford, CA.

Carter, J. A. and Poston, T. (2018) A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How. Series: Bloomsbury critical introductions to contemporary epistemology. Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781472514929

Alfano, M., Carter, J. A. and Cheong, M. (2018) Technological seduction and self-radicalization. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(3), pp. 298-322. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2018.27)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2018) The basing relation and the impossibility of the debasing demon. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), p. 203.

2017

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic pluralism, epistemic relativism and ‘hinge’ epistemology. In: Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave, pp. 229-252. ISBN 9783319654591

Carter, J. A. (2017) Virtuous insightfulness. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 539-554. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.37)

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2017) (Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), pp. 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (Eds.) (2017) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198716310

Carter, J. .A. , Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (2017) Knowledge-first: an introduction. In: Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (eds.) Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 1-18. ISBN 9780198716310 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0001)

Carter, J. A. and Navarro, J. (2017) The defeasibility of knowledge-how. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3), pp. 662-685. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12441)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, pp. 272-292. ISBN 9781138921931

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (Eds.) (2017) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Series: Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowman and Littlefield: London. ISBN 9781783489084

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) The moral psychology of pride: an introduction. In: Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (eds.) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Series: Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowan & Liitlefield: London, UK, pp. 1-11. ISBN 9781783489084

Carter, A. (2017) Review of Epistemology by Ernest Sosa. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2017, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2017) Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Can they learn from each other? In: Harris, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone. Routledge: New York, pp. 82-92. ISBN 9781138234215

Carter, A. , Collin, J. H. and Palermos, O. (2017) Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), pp. 387-402. (doi: 10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2017) The modal account of luck revisited. Synthese, 194(6), pp. 2175-2184. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1047-7)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1463-1476. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemological implications of relativism. In: Ichikawa, J. J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Taylor and Francis, pp. 292-301. ISBN 9781138818392

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic luck. In: Crane, T. (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis.

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) Googled assertion. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), pp. 490-501. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Inference to the best explanation and epistemic circularity. In: McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds.) Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198746904

2016

Carter, J. A. and Church, I. M. (2016) On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5(4), pp. 239-248. (doi: 10.1002/tht3.218)

Carter, J. A. , Peterson, M. and van Bezooijen, B. (2016) Not knowing a cat is a cat: analyticity and knowledge ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(4), pp. 817-834. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0279-7)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Objectual understanding, factivity and belief. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter, pp. 423-442. ISBN 9783110496345 (doi: 10.1515/9783110496765-020)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Epistemology and Relativism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. W. and Rubin, K. (2016) Belief without credence. Synthese, 193(8), pp. 2323-2351. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6)

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2016) Extended cognition and propositional memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(3), pp. 691-714. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12157)

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly: Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle [Guest Editors]. University of Illinois Press.

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2016) Extended knowledge-how. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 259-273. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9738-x)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2016) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 297-304. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives. Philosophical Studies, 173(4), pp. 969-990. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-015-0533-y)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Group peer disagreement. Ratio, 29(1), pp. 11-28. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12077)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(1), pp. 140-155. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12040)

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2(4), pp. 542-560. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2016.28)

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J. and Palermos, S. O. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of Logos and Episteme: Intellectual Humility [Guest Editors]. Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.

Carter, A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Intellectual humility, knowledge-how, and disagreement. In: Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 49-63. ISBN 9781138925168

Carter, J. A. (2016) Metaepistemology and Relativism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781137336637

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility. Logos and Episteme, 7(4), pp. 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Extended emotion. Philosophical Psychology, 29(2), pp. 198-217. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1063596)

Kerr, E. T. and Carter, J. A. (2016) Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity. Social Epistemology, 30(1), pp. 3-24. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971914)

2015

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), pp. 799-816. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2015) Epistemology and active externalism. In: Oxford Bibligraphies Online: Philosphy. Oxford University Press. (doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0285)

Baghramian, M. and Carter, J. A. (2015) Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 1-60.

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic luck. Noûs, 49(3), pp. 440-453. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12054)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), pp. 181-199. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12094)

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. W. and Rubin, K. (2015) Varieties of cognitive achievement. Philosophical Studies, 172(6), pp. 1603-1623. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2015) On cognitive and moral enhancement: a reply to Savulescu and Persson. Bioethics, 29(3), pp. 153-161. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.12076)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2015) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle. Erkenntnis, 80(1), pp. 1-13. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x)

Carter, J. A. (2015) Group knowledge and epistemic defeat. Ergo, 2(28), pp. 711-735. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.028)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber. Teaching Philosophy, 38(4), pp. 455-458. [Book Review]

2014

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2014) Extended Knowledge. Philosophical Issues. 24(1) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2014) Varieties of externalism. Philosophical Issues, 24(1), pp. 63-109. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12026)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) Openmindedness and truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 207-224. (doi: 10.1080/00455091.2014.923247)

Carter, J. A. and Nickel, P. J. (2014) On testimony and transmission. Episteme, 11(2), pp. 145-155. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.4)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. Synthese, 191(8), pp. 1683-1695. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0357-2)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Disagreement, relativism and doxastic revision. Erkenntnis, 79(S1), pp. 155-172. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9450-7)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Relativism, knowledge and understanding. Episteme, 11(1), pp. 35-52. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2013.45)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Review of Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (Eds) Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) Objectual understanding and the value problem. American Philosophical Quarterly, 51(1), pp. 1-13.

2013

Carter, J. A. (2013) Extended cognition and epistemic luck. Synthese, 190(18), pp. 4201-4214. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2013) Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(2), pp. 122-135. (doi: 10.1111/japp.12011)

Carter, J. A. (2013) Faulkner, Paul, Knowledge on Trust. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 409-413. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.775169)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2013) A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 253-275. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9315-x)

Carter, J. A. (2013) The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250), pp. 184-187. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00096.x)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. and Rubin, K. (2013) Knowledge: value on the cheap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 249-263. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.694455)

2012

Carter, J. A. and Jarvis, B. (2012) Against swamping. Analysis, 72(4), pp. 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)

Carter, J. A. and Chrisman, M. (2012) Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry? Philosophical Studies, 159(3), pp. 323-339. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-011-9710-9)

Carter, J. A. (2012) On Stanley’s intellectualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20(5), pp. 749-762. (doi: 10.1080/09672559.2012.741820)

Carter, J. A. (2012) Recent work on Moore’s proof. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2(2), pp. 115-144. (doi: 10.1163/221057011X560974)

2011

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2011) Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support. Philosophia, 39(4), pp. 615-635. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal. Acta Analytica, 26(3), pp. 285-293. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Radical skepticism, closure, and robust knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research, 36, pp. 115-133. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2011_2)

2010

Carter, J. A. (2010) Anti-luck epistemology and safety’s (recent) discontents. Philosophia, 38(3), pp. 517-532. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-009-9219-z)

Carter, J. A. (2010) Review of E. Sosa's "Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge," Volumes I and II. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

2009

Carter, J. A. (2009) On Cappelen and Hawthrone's "Relativism and Monadic Truth". ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

2008

Axtell, G. and Carter, J. A. (2008) Just the right thickness: a defense of second-wave virtue epistemology. Philosophical Papers, 37(3), pp. 413-434. (doi: 10.1080/05568640809485229)

This list was generated on Sun Nov 10 09:54:56 2024 GMT.
Jump to: Articles | Books | Book Sections | Book Reviews | Edited Books | Edited Journals
Number of items: 172.

Articles

Carter, J. A. (2024) Abduction, skepticism, and indirect realism. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02206-7) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Andrada, G. (2024) Intentional action, knowledge, and cognitive extension. Synthese, 204, 67. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-024-04691-z)

Titus, L. M. and Carter, J. A. (2024) What the tortoise should do: a knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation. Noûs, 58(2), pp. 456-481. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12460)

Carter, J. A. and Navarro, J. (2024) Fake knowledge-how. Philosophical Quarterly, (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqae049) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Cowan, R. (2024) Safety and dream scepticism in Sosa’s epistemology. Synthese, 203, 180. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-024-04577-0)

Kearl, T. and Carter, J. A. (2024) Easy practical knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Piedrahita, O. and Carter, J. A. (2024) Can AI believe? Philosophy and Technology, 37, 89. (doi: 10.1007/s13347-024-00780-6)

Pickel, B. and Carter, J. A. (2024) Frege on the tolerability of sense variation: a reply to Michaelson and Textor. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Trust and trustworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107(2), pp. 377-394. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12918)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Simion and Kelp on trustworthy AI. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 18. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00067-1)

Shepherd, J. and Carter, J. A. (2023) Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action. Ergo, 9, pp. 556-583. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.2277)

Carter, J. A. and Shepherd, J. (2023) Intentional action and knowledge-centred theories of control. Philosophical Studies, 180(3), pp. 957-977. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01904-4)

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2023) Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 55(3), pp. 290-300. (doi: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2037418)

Carter, J. A. (2022) On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 44. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00045-z)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Trust as performance. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), pp. 120-147. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12214)

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Therapeutic trust. Philosophical Psychology, (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2058925) (Early Online Publication)

Miracchi, L. and Carter, J. A. (2022) Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory. Synthese, 200, pp. 1-28. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03462-y)

Carter, J. A. and Sosa, E. (2022) Metaepistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Alfano, M., Fard, A. E., Carter, J. A. , Clutton, P. and Klein, C. (2021) Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube’s recommender system. Synthese, 199(1-2), pp. 835-858. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02724-x)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. and Grodniewicz, J.P. (2021) Understanding a communicated thought. Synthese, 198(12), pp. 12137-12151. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02854-2)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Archimedean metanorms. Topoi, 40(5), pp. 1075-1085. (doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9586-9)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2021) Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology. Erkenntnis, 86(5), pp. 1139-1159. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2021) Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. Synthese, 198(10), pp. 9243-9272. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02631-1)

Carter, J. A. , Dechauffour, G. and Lefftz, G. (2021) Introduction to Special Issue: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3517-3519. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03241-1)

Kotzee, B., Carter, J. A. and Siegel, H. (2021) Educating for intellectual virtue: a critique from action guidance. Episteme, 18(2), pp. 177-199. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.10)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Exercising abilities. Synthese, 198(3), pp. 2495-2509. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02227-4)

Carter, J. A. (2021) De Minimis Normativism: a new theory of full aptness. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(1), pp. 16-36. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa017)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5117-5136. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1181-2)

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2020) Varieties of cognitive integration. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 867-890. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12288)

Carter, J. A. (2020) On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. Philosophical Studies, 177, pp. 2299-2322. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2020) Skepticism motivated: on the skeptical import of motivated reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(6), pp. 702-718. (doi: 10.1017/can.2020.16)

Heersmink, R. and Carter, J. A. (2020) The philosophy of memory technologies: metaphysics, knowledge, and values. Memory Studies, 13(4), pp. 416-433. (doi: 10.1177/1750698017703810)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2937-2961. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1549-y)

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2020) Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives. Synthese, 197(6), pp. 2291-2294. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02662-8)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(2), 449-466-449-466. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem. Philosophical Studies, 177(5), pp. 1229-1254. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x)

Carter, J. A. and Simion, M. (2020) The ethics and epistemology of trust. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. Synthese, 196(12), pp. 4989-5007. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8)

Carter, J. A. , Pritchard, D. and Shepherd, J. (2019) Knowledge-how, understanding-why, and epistemic luck: an experimental study. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4), pp. 701-734. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9)

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2019) Vices of distrust. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10), pp. 25-32.

Carter, J. A. (2019) Radical scepticism and the epistemology of confusion. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 9(3), pp. 223-237. (doi: 10.1163/22105700-20191387)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Autonomy, cognitive offloading and education. Educational Theory, 68(6), pp. 657-673. (doi: 10.1111/edth.12338)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2019) The epistemology of cognitive enhancement. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 220-242. (doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhy040) (PMID:30877778)

Carter, J. A. (2018) On behalf of controversial view agnosticism. European Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), pp. 1358-1370. (doi: 10.1111/ejop.12333)

Carter, J. A. (2018) Meta-epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195(7), pp. 2877-2896. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9)

Carter, J. A. and McDonnell, N. (2018) Welcome to the machine. Philosophers' Magazine, 81, pp. 33-39. (doi: 10.5840/tpm20188144)

Carter, J. A. (2018) Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control. Metaphilosophy, 49(3), pp. 283-304. (doi: 10.1111/meta.12304)

Alfano, M., Carter, J. A. and Cheong, M. (2018) Technological seduction and self-radicalization. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(3), pp. 298-322. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2018.27)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2018) The basing relation and the impossibility of the debasing demon. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), p. 203.

Carter, J. A. (2017) Virtuous insightfulness. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 539-554. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.37)

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2017) (Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), pp. 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)

Carter, J. A. and Navarro, J. (2017) The defeasibility of knowledge-how. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3), pp. 662-685. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12441)

Carter, A. , Collin, J. H. and Palermos, O. (2017) Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), pp. 387-402. (doi: 10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2017) The modal account of luck revisited. Synthese, 194(6), pp. 2175-2184. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1047-7)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1463-1476. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) Googled assertion. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), pp. 490-501. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)

Carter, J. A. and Church, I. M. (2016) On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5(4), pp. 239-248. (doi: 10.1002/tht3.218)

Carter, J. A. , Peterson, M. and van Bezooijen, B. (2016) Not knowing a cat is a cat: analyticity and knowledge ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(4), pp. 817-834. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0279-7)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Epistemology and Relativism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. W. and Rubin, K. (2016) Belief without credence. Synthese, 193(8), pp. 2323-2351. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6)

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2016) Extended cognition and propositional memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(3), pp. 691-714. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12157)

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2016) Extended knowledge-how. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 259-273. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9738-x)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2016) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 297-304. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives. Philosophical Studies, 173(4), pp. 969-990. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-015-0533-y)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Group peer disagreement. Ratio, 29(1), pp. 11-28. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12077)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(1), pp. 140-155. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12040)

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2(4), pp. 542-560. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2016.28)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility. Logos and Episteme, 7(4), pp. 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Extended emotion. Philosophical Psychology, 29(2), pp. 198-217. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1063596)

Kerr, E. T. and Carter, J. A. (2016) Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity. Social Epistemology, 30(1), pp. 3-24. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971914)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), pp. 799-816. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)

Baghramian, M. and Carter, J. A. (2015) Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 1-60.

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic luck. Noûs, 49(3), pp. 440-453. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12054)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), pp. 181-199. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12094)

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. W. and Rubin, K. (2015) Varieties of cognitive achievement. Philosophical Studies, 172(6), pp. 1603-1623. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2015) On cognitive and moral enhancement: a reply to Savulescu and Persson. Bioethics, 29(3), pp. 153-161. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.12076)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2015) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle. Erkenntnis, 80(1), pp. 1-13. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x)

Carter, J. A. (2015) Group knowledge and epistemic defeat. Ergo, 2(28), pp. 711-735. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.028)

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2014) Varieties of externalism. Philosophical Issues, 24(1), pp. 63-109. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12026)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) Openmindedness and truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 207-224. (doi: 10.1080/00455091.2014.923247)

Carter, J. A. and Nickel, P. J. (2014) On testimony and transmission. Episteme, 11(2), pp. 145-155. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.4)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. Synthese, 191(8), pp. 1683-1695. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0357-2)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Disagreement, relativism and doxastic revision. Erkenntnis, 79(S1), pp. 155-172. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9450-7)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Relativism, knowledge and understanding. Episteme, 11(1), pp. 35-52. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2013.45)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) Objectual understanding and the value problem. American Philosophical Quarterly, 51(1), pp. 1-13.

Carter, J. A. (2013) Extended cognition and epistemic luck. Synthese, 190(18), pp. 4201-4214. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2013) Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(2), pp. 122-135. (doi: 10.1111/japp.12011)

Carter, J. A. (2013) A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 253-275. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9315-x)

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. and Rubin, K. (2013) Knowledge: value on the cheap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 249-263. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.694455)

Carter, J. A. and Jarvis, B. (2012) Against swamping. Analysis, 72(4), pp. 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)

Carter, J. A. and Chrisman, M. (2012) Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry? Philosophical Studies, 159(3), pp. 323-339. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-011-9710-9)

Carter, J. A. (2012) On Stanley’s intellectualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20(5), pp. 749-762. (doi: 10.1080/09672559.2012.741820)

Carter, J. A. (2012) Recent work on Moore’s proof. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2(2), pp. 115-144. (doi: 10.1163/221057011X560974)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2011) Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support. Philosophia, 39(4), pp. 615-635. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal. Acta Analytica, 26(3), pp. 285-293. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Radical skepticism, closure, and robust knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research, 36, pp. 115-133. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2011_2)

Carter, J. A. (2010) Anti-luck epistemology and safety’s (recent) discontents. Philosophia, 38(3), pp. 517-532. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-009-9219-z)

Axtell, G. and Carter, J. A. (2008) Just the right thickness: a defense of second-wave virtue epistemology. Philosophical Papers, 37(3), pp. 413-434. (doi: 10.1080/05568640809485229)

Books

Carter, J. A. and Kearl, T. (2024) Knowing How and Learning How: An Epistemic Theory of Control. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2024) A Telic Theory of Trust. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192888969 (doi: 10.1093/9780191982460.001.0001)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2023) Epistemology in the Subpersonal Vale. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence. Series: Epistemology Elements. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing. Oxford University Press: Oxford ; New York. ISBN 9780192846921 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780192846921.001.0001)

Littlejohn, C. and Carter, J. A. (2021) This is Epistemology: An Introduction. Series: This is philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell: Hoboken, NJ. ISBN 9781118336823

Carter, J. A. (2021) Digital Knowledge. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2021) The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY ; Abingdon, Oxon. ISBN 9780367901011 (doi: 10.4324/9781003023654)

Carter, J. A. and Poston, T. (2018) A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How. Series: Bloomsbury critical introductions to contemporary epistemology. Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781472514929

Carter, J. A. (2016) Metaepistemology and Relativism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781137336637

Book Sections

Carter, J. A. (2024) Knowledge norms and conversation. In: Silva Filho, W. J. (ed.) Epistemology of Conversation. Springer: Dordrecht. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Understanding, vulnerability and risk. In: González-Castán, Ó.L. (ed.) Cognitive Vulnerability: An Epistemological Approach. Series: Berlin studies in knowledge research, 18. De Gruyter: Berlin, pp. 177-192. ISBN 9783110799163 (doi: 10.1515/9783110799163-011)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Analysis of knowledge. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. 3rd Edition. Wiley. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Ichikawa, J. J. (2023) Intuitions. In: Oxford Bibliographies Online. Oxford University Press. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Reply to critics: collective (telic) virtue epistemology. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 363-366. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-48)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Reply to Gardiner on virtues of attention. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 73-76. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-8)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Reply to Watson on the social virtue of questioning. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 442-444. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-58)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals. In: Sosa, E., Steup, M., Turri, J. and Roeber, B. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-5)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Politics, deep disagreement, and relativism. In: Hannon, M. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9780367345907

Carter, J. A. (2021) Trust and its significance in social epistemology. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (In Press)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2020) The epistemology of group disagreement: an introduction. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 1-8. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-1)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2020) Deliberation and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 9-45. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-2)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2020) Intellectual humility and assertion. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Series: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. Routledge: Oxon, UK, pp. 335-345. ISBN 9780815364115

Carter, J. A. (2020) Collective (telic) virtue epistemology. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge: London. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. (2020) Is searching the internet making us intellectually arrogant? In: Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. P. (eds.) Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge, pp. 88-103. ISBN 9780367260859 (doi: 10.4324/9780429291395-9)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Epistemic autonomy and externalism. In: Lougheed, K. and Matheson, J. (eds.) Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge: London, UK. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Varieties of (extended) thought manipulation. In: Blitz, M. and Bublitz, C. (eds.) The Future of Freedom of Thought: Liberty, Technology, and Neuroscience. Palgrave Macmillan. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Koch, A.-K. (2020) Epistemic pluralism. In: Harris, P., Bitoni, A., Fleisher, C.S. and Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. (eds.) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783030445553 (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Mortini, D. (2020) Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York. ISBN 9780367343200

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) The superstitious lawyer's inference. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) Well-founded belief: an introduction. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Relativism and externalism. In: Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge: London. ISBN 9781138484283

Carter, J. A. (2019) Epistemic luck and the extended mind. In: Church, I. M. and Hartman, R. J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 318-319. ISBN 9780815366591

Carter, J. A. (2019) Virtue perspectivism, externalism, and epistemic circularity. In: Crețu, A.-M. and Massimi, M. (eds.) Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Series: Synthese library (Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science), 416. Springer: Cham, pp. 123-140. ISBN 9783030270407 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_8)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2018) Extended self-knowledge. In: Pedrini, P. and Kirsch, J. (eds.) Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Series: Contributions to phenomenology (96). Springer: Cham, pp. 31-49. ISBN 9783319986449 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_3)

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A. and Palermos, S. O. (2018) New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 331-351. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2018) Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 42-63. ISBN 9780198769811

Pritchard, D., Carter, J. A. and Turri, J. (2018) The value of knowledge. In: Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Stanford, CA.

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic pluralism, epistemic relativism and ‘hinge’ epistemology. In: Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave, pp. 229-252. ISBN 9783319654591

Carter, J. .A. , Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (2017) Knowledge-first: an introduction. In: Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (eds.) Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 1-18. ISBN 9780198716310 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0001)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, pp. 272-292. ISBN 9781138921931

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) The moral psychology of pride: an introduction. In: Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (eds.) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Series: Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowan & Liitlefield: London, UK, pp. 1-11. ISBN 9781783489084

Carter, J. A. (2017) Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Can they learn from each other? In: Harris, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone. Routledge: New York, pp. 82-92. ISBN 9781138234215

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemological implications of relativism. In: Ichikawa, J. J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Taylor and Francis, pp. 292-301. ISBN 9781138818392

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic luck. In: Crane, T. (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis.

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Inference to the best explanation and epistemic circularity. In: McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds.) Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198746904

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Objectual understanding, factivity and belief. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter, pp. 423-442. ISBN 9783110496345 (doi: 10.1515/9783110496765-020)

Carter, A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Intellectual humility, knowledge-how, and disagreement. In: Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 49-63. ISBN 9781138925168

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2015) Epistemology and active externalism. In: Oxford Bibligraphies Online: Philosphy. Oxford University Press. (doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0285)

Book Reviews

Carter, J. A. (2022) Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology. Philosophical Review, 131(2), pp. 235-240. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-9554769)[Book Review]

Carter, A. (2017) Review of Epistemology by Ernest Sosa. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2017, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber. Teaching Philosophy, 38(4), pp. 455-458. [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2014) Review of Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (Eds) Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2013) Faulkner, Paul, Knowledge on Trust. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 409-413. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.775169)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2013) The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250), pp. 184-187. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00096.x)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2010) Review of E. Sosa's "Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge," Volumes I and II. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2009) On Cappelen and Hawthrone's "Relativism and Monadic Truth". ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

Edited Books

Baghramian, M., Carter, J. A. and Rowland, R. (Eds.) (2021) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (Eds.) (2020) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9780367077426

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2020) Special Issue of Synthese: Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives [Guest Editors]. Springer. ISBN 0039-7857

Carter, J. A. , Leffetz, G. and Dechauffour, G. (Eds.) (2019) Special Issue of Synthese: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst [Guest Editors]. Springer. (In Press)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (Eds.) (2019) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198801764

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (Eds.) (2017) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198716310

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (Eds.) (2017) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Series: Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowman and Littlefield: London. ISBN 9781783489084

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly: Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle [Guest Editors]. University of Illinois Press.

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J. and Palermos, S. O. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of Logos and Episteme: Intellectual Humility [Guest Editors]. Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.

Edited Journals

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2014) Extended Knowledge. Philosophical Issues. 24(1) [Edited Journal]

This list was generated on Sun Nov 10 09:54:56 2024 GMT.

Grants

  • I am PI on a 3-year research grant Digital Knowledge: A New Framework for Digital Epistemic Virtues (the Co-I is Jesper Kallestrup, Aberdeen) (£980,602.20) The project runs from September 2022 - September 2025 and includes two postdocs and a PhD student.
  • I am Co-I on a 4-year research grant "Expanding Autonomy: Scaffolded, Embedded and Distributed” (£974,052.08) (the PI is Neil Levy, Oxford). The project runs from September 2022 - September 2026 and will include two postdocs.
  • I am PI on a 3-year research grant A Virtue Epistemology of Trust (Co-Is: Chris Kelp and Mona Simion) from the Leverhulme Trust (£254,871). This project runs from 2020-2023 and will included a PhD student and Postdoc. Further information
  • PI: Leverhulme Visitng Professorship, 2022 (£27,569)
  • PI (co-I: Chris Kelp): British Academy Small Grant (£10,000).

Paper prizes: 

  • Winner: 2019 Philosophical Quarterly essay prize for my paper 'De Minimis Normativism: A New Theory of Full Aptness' (£1500)
  • Philosopher's Annual (2018): my paper 'Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization' (with M. Alfano and M. Cheong) was selected for inclusion in the Philosopher's Annual as one of the 10 best papers published in Philospohy in 2018.

Supervision

I am happy to supervise students working on most topics in epistemology. 

Current PhD students (as lead or co-supervisor): 

Daniella Meehan

Dario Mortini

Martin Miragoli

Finn McCardel

Francis Jose

Lysette Chaprionere

Cian Brennan

Andrew Sherrod

Adam Nicholson

Louis Austin-Eames

Rory Aird

Joshua Cox

Dani Pino Sanchez (Seville)

Ignacio Gomez (Seville)

Jakob Ohlhorst (Cologne) 2021/2022

Anne-Kathrin Koch (Vienna) 09/2019-09/2020

Daniel Abrahams

Rie Iizuka

Ju Wang

Adam Bricker

Teaching

  • [Spring 2021] SH26 Virtue Epistemology 
  • [Spring 2021] MSc Conversion: Ethics (Introduction to Analytic Philosophy)
  • [Autumn 2020] MSc Conversion: Epistemology (Introduction to Analytic Philosophy)
  • [Autumn 2020] JH3 Epistemology (Moodle)
  • [Autumn 2019] SH26 Virtue Epistemology
  • [Spring 2019] MSc Phil. Methodology: Williamson's Metaphilosophy (syllabus)
  • [Spring 2019] SH26 Virtue Epistemology 
  • [Autumn 2018] MSc Epistemology: Intellectual Autonomy (syllabus)
  • [Spring 2018] SH26 Virtue Epistemology (syllabus)
  • [Spring 2018] JH7 Philosophy of Mind (syllabus)
  • [Autumn 2017] MSc Epistemology A (syllabus)
  • [Spring 2017] SH26 Virtue Epistemology (syllabus)

Additional information

I am Deputy Director and co-founder (with Chris Kelp and Mona Simion) of COGITO Epistemology Research Centre. For details about the Centre, see here. 

I am PI on two major research projects: (i) a 3-year AHRC-funded research grant Digital Knowledge: A New Framework for Digital Epistemic Virtues (the Co-I is Jesper Kallestrup, Aberdeen) (September 2022 - September 2025); and (ii) a 3-year research grant A Virtue Epistemology of Trust (Co-Is: Chris Kelp and Mona Simion) from the Leverhulme Trust (July 2020-July 2023). Further information. I am also Co-I on a 4-year research grant "Expanding Autonomy: Scaffolded, Embedded and Distributed” (the PI is Neil Levy, Oxford). This project runs from September 2022 - September 2026.

I am also Treasurer of the British Society for the Theory of Knowledge. 

I co-edit the book series Epistemology Elements with Cambridge University Press. 

From 2018-2021 I have been Graduate Studies Convenor in the School of Humanities. 

I am a member of the AHRC Peer-Review College (2022-2027).

 

 


J. Adam Carter