School of Social & Political Sciences

Despite recent electoral embarrassment, polling suggests enduring support for independence and the SNP. While the challenges for the SNP are clear - to clean up their image, shape the narrative around independence and break the political deadlock that hampers it - independence will ultimately only be delivered if a unified pro-independence campaign can be constructed

According to recent polling, the independence movement finds itself in a strong position, with opinion polls at the time of writing indicating that the Yes campaign would win a second referendum if it were held now. Further polling also suggests the SNP would reclaim lots of political ground they lost in their disastrous 2024 Westminster campaign at the next general election. Moreover, the party look likely to win the upcoming Holyrood election in 2026, continuing their term as Scotland's party of government. While they would lose seats, a pro-independence majority would still be in place thanks to the continuing electoral advancement of the Scottish Greens. Overall, despite how thing may have appeared to commentators in the aftermath of the recent Labour Westminster landslide, the issue of Scottish independence looks like it will remain a central aspect of Scottish politics for the foreseeable future.

A return to nationalist fortunes?

However, the independence movement should not take too much solace from these numbers. Only around 20% of the population see independence as an important issue currently and, despite their continued lead in the polls, the SNP's governmental record is becoming increasingly unpopular. The party has failed to tackle the climate crisis, improve education and increase living standards according to the Scottish people, and their management of the NHS and the economy - the two most pressing political issues for Scots - is seen to be especially poor. This has led to a majoirty of the country declaring they do not trust the Scottish government to deliver for them. In Holyrood's over 25 years of existence this is the first time this has ever happened. The effect of of the SNP record on government trust is especially damning considering 71% of Scots had faith in their parliament when the party took office in 2007. That figure is now down to 47%. Furthermore, 63% of people do not believe the SNP have a sound, long-term economic plan for the country. An SNP victory in 2026 would thus be an entirely loveless one. 

If the SNP and the wider independence movement want to capitalise on their position, they must work to restore public trust. Given past trends, it is reasonable to assume that a move towards this would lead to a consolidation of current independence support. Sustained leads for the independence campaign in polling have typically come at times when the SNP were able to constrast their effectiveness in government with the ineptitude of Westminster. The clearest example of this is during the pandemic, when the Holyrood response was viewed far more favourably in Scotland than that of the British government. As a result, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's approval rating reached new heights, soaring to over 70% at a time when the same percentage of Scots disapproved of Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

This correlated with independence support reaching some of its highest points on record. The Yes movement largely maintained this advantage until the chaotic resignation of Sturgeon cast doubt on their capabilities. Thus, high public trust in a nationalist government will inevitably lead to support for their aims, especially when the alternative is so unpopular. 

Governing competence and the pathway to independence

Despite their perceived incompetence currently, this is something Scottish Nationalists can, and do, still drawn upon as a basis for support. While most Scots have no faith in the SNP even fewer of them view Westminster positively. 76% of Scots believe the Scottish economy is in a bad way, however 54% blame Westminster for this while a lesser 52% blame the Scottish government. Furthermore, despite both having net approval ratings of -11, First Minister John Swinney and Deputy First Minister Kate Forbes still poll as Scotland's most popular politicians. Finally, while trust in Holyrood is at its lowest point in history, these figure pale in comparison to the 77% of Scots that believe Westminster does not represent their interests. The fact remains that Westminster's unpopularity still fuels nationalist support. As a permanent party of opposition in the British parliament, the SNP can effectively contrast itself against it to maintain their own position as Scotland's de-facto party of government. This is a great resource of political capital it cannot afford to squander and if their own record continues to worsen their front of comparative competence may begin to shatter. 

However, the SNP can take a degree of comfort in the fact that Westminster's popularity does not look set to improve anytime soon in Scotland. Much of the continued unpopularity of the British government can be attributed to Scotland rarely voting for its governing party. Until Starmer in 2024, the last Prime Minister that Scotland actually voted for was Tony Blair. Given Scotland was thus subject to 14 years of Tory government from 2010 onwards, a party it had not voted for since 1955, it is hardly unsurprising most of the country feels Westminster does not represent them. However, even now Scotland has a prime minister that it did vote for, this has made no difference. Keir Starmer is broadly unpopular amongst Scots, saddled with a net approval rating of -23, and confidence in his own party's vision for Scotland's future is even lower than that of the SNP. The fact that Scots have grown distrustful of Labour already shows the national resentment towards Westminster is more substantive than mere anti-Toryism and, despite their own lack of favour with the Scottish people, the SNP and the wider independence movement are the logical beneficiaries of this. 

This disillusionment inevitably trickles down to Scottish politics. After looking on track to become Scotland's party of government last year, Scottish Labour are now politically miles behind the SNP and are set to suffer the lowest Holyrood seat tally in their history at the next election. Furthermore, Scots generally believe Scottish labour would be a worse option in government - an assertion that is seemingly based on nothing but sheer unpopularity given they have not governed in Holyrood for 18 years. It is hard to picture a reality in which the Scottish Conservatives win at Holyrood, if a Unionist party is to unseat the SNP it will be Scottish Labour and now this prospect is becoming increasingly unlikely. Scotland looks set for a future of perpetual SNP government. 

But what does this mean for independence? Westminster's unpopularity will be enough to keep the SNP in government, but it does not translate directly to sustained support for leaving the UK. Since the establishment of Holyrood, the Scottish Government has always been more popular than their Westminster counterpart yet the majority of the polls since the referendum still indicate a likely no vote. However, appearing more favourable than the British government does have its concrete political uses. It is useful so far as it puts the onus clearly on the SNP and the independence movement to lead the debate. If the SNP remain in government, independence will remain an issue of core political importance. The ball is in their court, yet they have not done anything with it. In the years since the referendum the vision for independence has not developed in any meaningful way. If the independence movement do not forward a clearer plan, then the debate will remain deadlocked. 

It was economic issues that mattered most to voters in 2014. In polling prior to the referendum, 52% of Scots indicated that they would vote for independence if they knew they would be better off as a result while only 30% indicated they would still vote against it. These figures show that the 2014 referendum result was not indicative of strong Unionist feeling in Scotland, which would be harder to overturn, but rather a failure on the part of the Yes campaign to outline a clear economic vision. The base for independence is there for the political taking yet the economics around it remain unclear ten years on. There have been efforts made to change this, most recently in the form of the 2018 Growth Commission. However, this does not develop the currency policy of continued sterlingisation that was unconvincing in 2014 and advocates for a programme of cuts that would have a similiar effect to Tory austerity in making many Scots worse off. Following this recommendation would be political suicide for a movement that has built so much of its political strength on an anti-austerity platform and would spell guaranteed defeat in a future referendum with 72% of Scots stating they would oppose independence if they were likely to be economically punished by it.

Thus, presently, no mainstream, coherent vision for independence exists. This must change. The independence movement now exists at a crossroads. It either works to form a conception of it that cuts through to the Scottish people and soothes their economic fears to a degree or it can opt to continue existing in the current state of deadlock in which the SNP continue in government, but independence gets no closer to becoming a reality. Clever political manoeuvring would be required for the adoption of the former as pro-independence politicians could very easily fall victim to the common attack line that they are focusing too much on constitutional factors. This will also be an incredibly effective criticism if the SNP do not improve their record and people continue to place little importance on independence as an issue. However, given Westminster's persistent unpopularity and its current position of strength, it makes sense for the Independence movement to act now to define the way the narrative around independence will move in the next ten years. 

 

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This blog is part of the SPS Studen Academic Blog Series. You can read more contributions from the series here.

First published: 14 April 2025