Professor Mona Simion

  • Professor of Philosophy (Philosophy)

Biography

I am Professor of Philosophy and Director of the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre. 

My research is mainly in epistemology, philosophy of language, and moral & political philosophy. I am the author of 'Resistance to Evidence' (Cambridge University Press 2024), 'Shifty Speech and Independent Thought;' (Oxford University Press 2021), and 'Sharing Knowledge' (Cambridge University Press, 2021, with C. Kelp), as well as of the Cambridge Element 'Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Defence'  (CUP 2025). I am currently working on a new monograph entitled 'Conceptual Engineering: The Epistemology, Ethics, and Politics of Meaning Production' (for Oxford University Press). 

I am the 2018 Mind Fellow and the winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021.

I am Principal Investigator on a major 5-year research project - KnowledgeLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology - funded by a 1.5 million Euro grant from the European Research Council (2021-2026). I am also Co-Investigator on the Leverhulme Trust-funded 'Virtue Epistemology of Trust' project (GBP 254,871; 2020-2023) and Principal Investigator on the 'Dimensions of Wellbeing' industry-funded project (GBP 680,031; 2021-2026). Before this I held the Mind Association Fellowship for my 'Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions' project. 

I am Associate Editor at Philosophical Studies​, Managing Editor at Ergo, and I sit on the Editorial Board of the Philosophical Quarterly. I also sit on the Executive Committee of the Initiative for Science in Europe, the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society, the Advisory Council of the Institute of Philosophy, the Management Committee of the British Society for Theory of Knowledge, and the  Steering Committee of the Social Epistemology Network. I am an elected fellow and Board Member of the Young Academy of Europe, and elected fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh Young Academy of Scotland.

Research interests

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Moral & Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Gender and Race, Philosophical Methodology, Philosophy of AI. 
AoC: Philosophy of Social Science, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Psychology, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Information, Media and Communication Theory.

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2014
Number of items: 78.

2024

Mace, L. and Simion, M. (2024) What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02247-y) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2024) Disinformation, politically motivated reasoning, and knowledge resistance. European Review, (doi: 10.1017/S1062798724000218) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to Evidence. Series: Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781009298520 (doi: 10.1017/9781009298537)

Simion, M. (2024) Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice. Inquiry, 67(2), pp. 762-768. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2167233) (PMID:38196841) (PMCID:PMC10773469)

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1), pp. 203-216. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964)

Simion, M. and Willard-Kyle, C. (2024) Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 87-101. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2223221)

Simion, M. (2024) Two dilemmas for value sensitive technological design. In: Edwards, M. L. and Palermos, S. O. (eds.) Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies. Series: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 116-128. ISBN 9781032229201 (doi: 10.4324/9781003275992-8)

2023

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2023) What is trustworthiness? Noûs, 57(3), pp. 667-683. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12448)

Simion, M. (2023) Knowledge and disinformation. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2023.25) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Linguistic innovation for gender terms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222155) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Trustworthy artificial intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 8. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00063-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2023) Special Issue: Knowledge-First Epistemology. Synthese. [Edited Journal] (In Press)

2022

Simion, M. (2022) The epistemic normativity of conjecture. Philosophical Studies, 179(11), pp. 3447-3471. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01829-y)

Simion, M. (2022) The Epistemology of Groups. Philosophical Review, 131(4), pp. 537-541. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-10136960)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Sosa on permissible suspension and the proper remit of the theory of knowledge. Res Philosophica, 99(4), pp. 453-466. (doi: 10.11612/resphil.2138)

Simion, M. (2022) Closure, warrant transmission, and defeat. In: Jope, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Closure and Transmission. Routledge. ISBN 9781003104766 (doi: 10.4324/9781003104766-4)

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Simion, M. (2022) Being Rational and Being Right, By Juan Comesaña. Mind, 131(523), pp. 1005-1015. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzab010)[Book Review]

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

Simion, M. (2022) Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, [Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering. In: Damböck, C. and Schiemer, G. (eds.) Carnap Handbuch. Metzler Verlag. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562373) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Defeat. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Engineering evidence. In: Isaac, M. G. and Scharp, K. (eds.) New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge still comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Trusting AI: explainability vs. trustworthiness. In: Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R. (eds.) Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

2021

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Simion, M. (2021) Disagreement and epistemic improvement. Synthese, 199, pp. 14641-14665. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03437-5)

Simion, M. (2021) Blame as performance. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 7595-7614. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03130-7)

Simion, M. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 10371-10388. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z)

Simion, M. (2021) Testimonial contractarianism: a knowledge-first social epistemology. Noûs, 55(4), pp. 891-916. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12337)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009036818 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Simion, M. (2021) Skepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-9)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

Simion, M. (2021) Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pqaa075. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa075)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(3), pp. 681-684. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa048)[Book Review]

Simion, M. I. , Schnurr, J. and Gordon, E. C. (2021) Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3553-3564. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1)

Simion, M. (2021) Assertion compatibilism. In: Kyriacou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.) Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge. ISBN 9780429353468 (doi: 10.4324/9780429353468-18)

Simion, M. (2021) Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192895288

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198847205

Simion, M. (2021) Epistemology. In: Rossberg, M. (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (2021) Introduction. In: Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 1-17. ISBN 9780198847205 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0001)

Simion, M. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2021) Knowledge and disagreement. In: Baghramian, M., Carter, J. A. and Rowland, R. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

2020

Kelp, C. , Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. and Simion, M. (2020) Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5187-5202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Conceptual innovation, function first. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 985-1002. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12302)

Miragoli, M. and Simion, M. (2020) Gender, race, and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 125-138. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-7)

Simion, M. (2020) A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 311-323. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12187)

Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) How to be an anti-reductionist. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2849-2866. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Assertion: the constitutive norms view. In: Goldberg, S. C. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780190675233 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.2)

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (2020) Editorial. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(1), pp. 1-3. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10072-5)

Simion, M. (2020) Social epistemology of education. In: Peters, M. A. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer. ISBN 9789812875327 (doi: 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_696-1)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), pp. 125-137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5)

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2020) Ethics, Knowledge and Language: Selected Papers from the Annual Meeting of the British Society for Ethical Theory 2019. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 23(1) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. and Simion, M. (2020) The ethics and epistemology of trust. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) A social epistemology of assertion. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

2019

Simion, M. (2019) A puzzle for epistemic WAMs. Synthese, 196(11), pp. 4679-4689. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1681-3)

Simion, M. (2019) Knowledge‐first functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), pp. 254-267. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12152)

Simion, M. (2019) Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), pp. 1951-1966. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8)

Simion, M. (2019) Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief-assertion parallel. Analysis, 79(2), pp. 260-265. (doi: 10.1093/analys/any048)

Simion, M. (2019) Assertion: the context shiftiness dilemma. Mind and Language, 34(4), pp. 503-517. (doi: 10.1111/mila.12221)

Simion, M. (2019) Hermeneutical injustice as basing failure. In: Carter, J. A. and Bondy, P. (eds.) Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

2018

Simion, M. (2018) No epistemic norm for action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), pp. 231-238.

Simion, M. (2018) The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), pp. 477-488. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6)

Simion, M. (2018) Epistemic trouble for engineering ‘woman'. Logos and Episteme, 9(1), pp. 91-98.

Simion, M. (2018) The 'should' in conceptual engineering. Inquiry, 61(8), pp. 914-928. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392894)

2017

Simion, M. (2017) Epistemic norms and 'he said/she said' reporting. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 413-422. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.11)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Commodious knowledge. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1487-1502. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0938-3)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), pp. 76-93. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201711426)

2016

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: knowledge is enough. Synthese, 193(10), pp. 3041-3056. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

Simion, M. , Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26, pp. 374-392. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12077)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: just one way to take it back. Logos and Episteme, 7(3), pp. 385-391.

Simion, M. (2016) Non-probabilistic decision strategies behind the veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3), pp. 557-572. (doi: 10.1007/s10790-015-9536-3)

Simion, M. (2016) Perception, history and benefit. Episteme, 13(1), pp. 61-76. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2015.56)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion, knowledge and rational credibility: the scoreboard. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter: Boston, pp. 137-164. ISBN 9783110496345

2014

Simion, M. (2014) Aggregating reasons and persons: on sorting out the logic of the good, Royce’s style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2), pp. 107-121. (doi: 10.1163/18758185-90000293)

This list was generated on Sat Dec 21 23:09:22 2024 GMT.
Jump to: Articles | Books | Book Sections | Book Reviews | Edited Books | Edited Journals
Number of items: 78.

Articles

Mace, L. and Simion, M. (2024) What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02247-y) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2024) Disinformation, politically motivated reasoning, and knowledge resistance. European Review, (doi: 10.1017/S1062798724000218) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2024) Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice. Inquiry, 67(2), pp. 762-768. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2167233) (PMID:38196841) (PMCID:PMC10773469)

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1), pp. 203-216. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964)

Simion, M. and Willard-Kyle, C. (2024) Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 87-101. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2223221)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2023) What is trustworthiness? Noûs, 57(3), pp. 667-683. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12448)

Simion, M. (2023) Knowledge and disinformation. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2023.25) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Linguistic innovation for gender terms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222155) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Trustworthy artificial intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 8. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00063-5)

Simion, M. (2022) The epistemic normativity of conjecture. Philosophical Studies, 179(11), pp. 3447-3471. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01829-y)

Simion, M. (2022) Sosa on permissible suspension and the proper remit of the theory of knowledge. Res Philosophica, 99(4), pp. 453-466. (doi: 10.11612/resphil.2138)

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562373) (Early Online Publication)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Simion, M. (2021) Disagreement and epistemic improvement. Synthese, 199, pp. 14641-14665. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03437-5)

Simion, M. (2021) Blame as performance. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 7595-7614. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03130-7)

Simion, M. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 10371-10388. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z)

Simion, M. (2021) Testimonial contractarianism: a knowledge-first social epistemology. Noûs, 55(4), pp. 891-916. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12337)

Simion, M. I. , Schnurr, J. and Gordon, E. C. (2021) Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3553-3564. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1)

Kelp, C. , Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. and Simion, M. (2020) Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5187-5202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Conceptual innovation, function first. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 985-1002. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12302)

Simion, M. (2020) A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 311-323. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12187)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) How to be an anti-reductionist. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2849-2866. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y)

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (2020) Editorial. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(1), pp. 1-3. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10072-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), pp. 125-137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5)

Carter, J. A. and Simion, M. (2020) The ethics and epistemology of trust. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Simion, M. (2019) A puzzle for epistemic WAMs. Synthese, 196(11), pp. 4679-4689. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1681-3)

Simion, M. (2019) Knowledge‐first functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), pp. 254-267. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12152)

Simion, M. (2019) Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), pp. 1951-1966. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8)

Simion, M. (2019) Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief-assertion parallel. Analysis, 79(2), pp. 260-265. (doi: 10.1093/analys/any048)

Simion, M. (2019) Assertion: the context shiftiness dilemma. Mind and Language, 34(4), pp. 503-517. (doi: 10.1111/mila.12221)

Simion, M. (2018) No epistemic norm for action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), pp. 231-238.

Simion, M. (2018) The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), pp. 477-488. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6)

Simion, M. (2018) Epistemic trouble for engineering ‘woman'. Logos and Episteme, 9(1), pp. 91-98.

Simion, M. (2018) The 'should' in conceptual engineering. Inquiry, 61(8), pp. 914-928. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392894)

Simion, M. (2017) Epistemic norms and 'he said/she said' reporting. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 413-422. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.11)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Commodious knowledge. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1487-1502. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0938-3)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), pp. 76-93. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201711426)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: knowledge is enough. Synthese, 193(10), pp. 3041-3056. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

Simion, M. , Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26, pp. 374-392. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12077)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: just one way to take it back. Logos and Episteme, 7(3), pp. 385-391.

Simion, M. (2016) Non-probabilistic decision strategies behind the veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3), pp. 557-572. (doi: 10.1007/s10790-015-9536-3)

Simion, M. (2016) Perception, history and benefit. Episteme, 13(1), pp. 61-76. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2015.56)

Simion, M. (2014) Aggregating reasons and persons: on sorting out the logic of the good, Royce’s style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2), pp. 107-121. (doi: 10.1163/18758185-90000293)

Books

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to Evidence. Series: Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781009298520 (doi: 10.1017/9781009298537)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009036818 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Simion, M. (2021) Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192895288

Book Sections

Simion, M. (2024) Two dilemmas for value sensitive technological design. In: Edwards, M. L. and Palermos, S. O. (eds.) Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies. Series: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 116-128. ISBN 9781032229201 (doi: 10.4324/9781003275992-8)

Simion, M. (2022) Closure, warrant transmission, and defeat. In: Jope, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Closure and Transmission. Routledge. ISBN 9781003104766 (doi: 10.4324/9781003104766-4)

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering. In: Damböck, C. and Schiemer, G. (eds.) Carnap Handbuch. Metzler Verlag. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Defeat. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Engineering evidence. In: Isaac, M. G. and Scharp, K. (eds.) New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge still comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Trusting AI: explainability vs. trustworthiness. In: Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R. (eds.) Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2021) Skepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-9)

Simion, M. (2021) Assertion compatibilism. In: Kyriacou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.) Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge. ISBN 9780429353468 (doi: 10.4324/9780429353468-18)

Simion, M. (2021) Epistemology. In: Rossberg, M. (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (2021) Introduction. In: Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 1-17. ISBN 9780198847205 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0001)

Simion, M. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2021) Knowledge and disagreement. In: Baghramian, M., Carter, J. A. and Rowland, R. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Miragoli, M. and Simion, M. (2020) Gender, race, and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 125-138. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-7)

Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Assertion: the constitutive norms view. In: Goldberg, S. C. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780190675233 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.2)

Simion, M. (2020) Social epistemology of education. In: Peters, M. A. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer. ISBN 9789812875327 (doi: 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_696-1)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) A social epistemology of assertion. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2019) Hermeneutical injustice as basing failure. In: Carter, J. A. and Bondy, P. (eds.) Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion, knowledge and rational credibility: the scoreboard. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter: Boston, pp. 137-164. ISBN 9783110496345

Book Reviews

Simion, M. (2022) The Epistemology of Groups. Philosophical Review, 131(4), pp. 537-541. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-10136960)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Being Rational and Being Right, By Juan Comesaña. Mind, 131(523), pp. 1005-1015. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzab010)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, [Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pqaa075. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa075)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(3), pp. 681-684. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa048)[Book Review]

Edited Books

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198847205

Edited Journals

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2023) Special Issue: Knowledge-First Epistemology. Synthese. [Edited Journal] (In Press)

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2020) Ethics, Knowledge and Language: Selected Papers from the Annual Meeting of the British Society for Ethical Theory 2019. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 23(1) [Edited Journal]

This list was generated on Sat Dec 21 23:09:22 2024 GMT.

Grants

  • ‘Founder’s Fund for Creatives’ Innovation Prize: DisinfoCheck: first Steps Towards Building a Disinformation-Tracking AI (GBP 10,000). Awarded by: Glasgow City Region, Scottish Funding Council, the University of Glasgow's Innovation Fund, the Entrepreneurial Campus, the Glasgow School of Art, and The Royal Conservatoire of Scotland.
  • ‘Distrust in Expertise: A Philosophical Investigation’ (GBP19,987). Awarded by: Radboud-Glasgow Collaboration Fund (Co-PI, with Harmen Ghijsen).
  • Horizon Europe Network Seed Fund (GBP 5,000). Awarded by: University of Glasgow.
  • European Commission Grant: Erasmus Mundus Design Measures (EUR 55,000). Awarded by: European Commission (Co-I, with Chris Kelp (PI) and J. Adam Carter)
  • Young Epistemologist Prize 2021 (USD 1000).
  • ERC Grant: ‘KnowledgeLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology (PI, EUR 1,470,000). Awarded by: European Research Council.
  • Leverhulme Research Grant: ‘A Virtue Epistemology of Trust’ (GBP 254,871). Awarded by: Leverhulme Trust, UK (Co-I, with J. Adam Carter (PI) and Chris Kelp)
  • Industry Grant: ‘Dimensions of Wellbeing’ (GBP 332,075). Awarded by: Therme Group, Austria (PI, with Chris Kelp)
  • Speaker Series Grant: ‘Epistemic Risk’ (GBP 3,000). Awarded by: Chancellors’ Fund, University of Glasgow (with Chris Kelp and J. Adam Carter).
  • Conference Grant: ‘Uncertainty and Rationality’ Arche-Cogito Conference (GBP 1,177) Awarded by: Scots Philosophical Association (with Justin Snedegar).
  • Conference Grant: ‘European Epistemology Network Meeting 2020’ (GBP 1,500) Awarded by: Mind Association (with Chris Kelp).
  • Conference Grant: ‘European Epistemology Network Meeting 2020’ (GBP 1,500) Awarded by: Scots Philosophical Association (with Chris Kelp).
  • Speaker Series Grant: ‘Knowledge and Society’ (GBP 5,000). Awarded by: Chancellors’ Fund, University of Glasgow (with Chris Kelp and J. Adam Carter).
  • Conference Grant: ‘Perception: Epistemology and Mind’ (GBP 1,500). Awarded by: Scots Philosophical Association (with Derek Brown).
  • Conference & Knowledge Exchange Grant: ‘Dimensions of Wellbeing.’ (GBP 3,600). Awarded by: Therme Group and University of Glasgow (with J. Adam Carter and Chris Kelp).
  • Network Grant: ‘Blame and Responsibility’ (GBP 10,000). Awarded by: Royal Society of Edinburgh (Key Contributor, with Jessica Brown (PI), J. Adam Carter, Chris Kelp, Ellie Mason, Aidan McGlynn, Patrick Todd (Co-Key Contributors)).
  • Conference Grant: Glasgow Graduate Conference in Epistemology and Mind (GBP 3,000). Awarded by: Analysis Trust, Scots Philosophical Association, Mind Association (with Jennifer Corns).
  • Knowledge Exchange and Impact Grant: Wellbeing (GBP 2,400). Awarded by: Therme Group and University of Glasgow (with J. Adam Carter and Christoph Kelp).
  • Conference Grant: ‘European Normativity Network Meeting 2018’ (GBP 1,800) Awarded by: Analysis Trust and Scots Philosophical Association (with Robert Cowan and Christoph Kelp).
  • Mind Research Fellowship: ‘Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions’ (GBP 23,000). Awarded by: The Mind Association.
  • Conference Grant: ‘Knowledge First: Themes from Tim Williamson’ (GBP 4,700). Awarded by: The Mind Association, the Analysis Trust and Cardiff University.
  • Conference Grant: ‘1st Social Epistemology Network Event’ (EUR 15,000) Awarded by: Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo (with Andrew Peet).
  • ConceptLab Postdoctoral Research Fellowship: ‘Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms’ (EUR 140,000). Awarded by: Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature and ConceptLab, University of Oslo.
  • Visiting Fellowship: ‘JuMo Early Career Mobility Funding’ (EUR 14,500). 9 months research stay at UC Riverside and UC Irvine. Awarded by: KU Leuven. Sponsors: Peter Graham and Sven Bernecker.
  • Conference Grant: ‘Epistemic Norms’ (EUR 4,500). Awarded by: FWO (Research Foundation Flanders) and Van de Wielefonds.
  • Graduate Student Subsidy 89th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association (GBP 500). Awarded by: The Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.
  • Doctoral Research Fellowship (EUR 105,000). Awarded by: FWO (Research Foundation Flanders) and KU Leuven.

Supervision

I am happy to supervise PhD projects in epistemology, philosophy of language, moral & political philosophy, and feminist philosophy, as well as at their intersection.

Postdocs

  • 2024-2026: Spencer Paulson (epistemology, mind)
  • 2025: Tarcisio Cardoso (communication studies)
  • 2023-2024: Claire Field (epistemology, ethics, philosophy of logic)
  • 2023: Sebastian Schmidt (epistemology, ethics)
  • 2022-2024: Timothy Kearl (epistemology, ethics, metaphysics)
  • 2022-2026: Lilith Mace (epistemology, language)
  • 2020-2022: Emma C. Gordon (ethics, epistemology, philosophy of medicine)
  • 2020-2024: Christopher Willard-Kyle (epistemology, philosophy of language, ethics, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion)
  • 2020-2021: Matthew Jope (epistemology)

 

PhD students

  • 2022-2024: Dannielle Deans (Glasgow; epistemic injustice)
  • 2022-2026: Giorgia Foti (Glasgow; social epistemology)
  • 2022-2026: Jinxi Luo (Glasgow; philosophy of argumentation, social and political philosophy, ethics, gender & race)
  • 2022-2026: Guillaume Andrieux (Glasgow; ethics of belief)
  • 2022: Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews, epistemology, philosophy of science (external supervisor))
  • 2022-2026: Shemaraiah Bloomfield-Johnson (Glasgow; philosophy of language, Wittgenstein, cultural anthropology,)
  • 2022: Joel Yalland (Kent; social epistemology (external supervisor))
  • 2022: Samra Soomro (Foundation University Islamabad; pragmatics, feminist philosophy, English literature (external supervisor))
  • 2022: Natascha Rietdijk (Tilburg University; political philosophy, epistemology (external supervisor))
  • 2021-2025 Han Edgoose (Glasgow; gender & race, epistemology)
  • 2021-2023 Clara Wisenfeld-Paine (Glasgow; feminism, philosophy of science, social epistemology)
  • 2021-2025 Louis Austin-Eames (Glasgow; ethics, metaethics)
  • 2021-2025 Ross Patrizio (Glasgow; social epistemology)
  • 2020-2025 Isak Andri Olafsson (Glasgow; virtue epistemology, ethics and epistemology of trust)
  • 2020-2021 Sam Kang (Carnegie Mellon; conceptual engineering, feminism, political philosophy (external supervisor))
  • 2021-2022 Nastasia Mueller (Berlin; virtue epistemology (external supervisor))
  • 2020-2024 Paul Irikefe (Cardiff; philosophical methodology, epistemology (external supervisor))
  • 2020-2021 Yasmeen Hindawi (Glasgow; gender & race, philosophy of language, social ontology, political philosophy)
  • 2019-2023 Shweta Pandey (Glasgow; feminist epistemology, conceptual engineering, Indian philosophy)
  • 2018-2022 Daniella Meehan (Glasgow; blame, vice epistemology)
  • 2018-2022 Martin Miragoli (Glasgow; social epistemology, gender&race, hinge epistemology, perception)
  • 2017 – 2023 Daniela Rusu (Glasgow; feminist epistemology, feminist philosophy of language, feminist ethics)
  • 2017 – 2018 Paul Hampson (Cardiff; conceptual engineering)
  • 2016-2020 Maria Mendez (Glasgow; political philosophy, feminism, epistemology)

 

Teaching

Areas of Competence: epistemology, philosophy of language, moral philosophy, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, philosophical methodology, social ontology, logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, history of analytic.

   

Undergraduate

PHIL 1010: Philosophy 1A: How Can I Know? 

SH12: Gender & Race 

 

Postgraduate

MSc Feminist Philosophy 

MSc Philosophy of Language 

MSc Research Methods

MSc Conversion Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Professional activities & recognition

Prizes, awards & distinctions

  • 2021: Young Epistemologist Prize (Rutgers University)

Research fellowships

  • 2019 - 2019: Mind Research Fellowship, UK
  • 2017 - 2017: CSMN & ConceptLab Postdoctoral Fellowship, Norway
  • 2016 - 2017: JUMO Mobility Fellowship, Belgium

Editorial boards

  • 2018: Philosophical Quarterly
  • 2021: Philosophical Studies
  • 2022: Ergo
  • 2023: Asian Journal of Philosophy

Professional & learned societies

  • 2021: Board Member, Aristotelian Society
  • 2024: Executive Committee Member, Initiative for Science in Europe
  • 2021: Board Member, Young Academy of Europe
  • 2022: Advisory Board Member, Institute of Philosophy
  • 2017: Steering Committee Member, Social Epistemology Network
  • 2019: Management Committee member, British Society for the Theory of Knowledge
  • 2017: Member, European Normativity Network

Additional information

Impact & Outreach

  • 2024. Informing the political priorities of the next European Commission: Evidence Submitted for the ‘ERC Feedback to Policy’ Call of the European Commission for Evidence on EU Policies and Strategies Concerning Democracy.
  • 2024. Knowledge and Disiformation. Keynote Talk at the Madrid Festival of Ideas.
  • 2024. Interviewed by Lucia Gomez, for the Madrid Festival of Ideas.
  • 2024. White Paper: Defining Well-Being. In response to Scottish Government's Consultation for the Wellbeing and Sustainable Development Bill (with Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, and Chris Kelp). 
  • 2023. 'Knowledge & Society' Public Outreach Event: Philosophy talks and art exhibition on issues in social epistemology (with Elizabeth Gray (Glasgow School of Art) and Pinelopi Stylianopoulou (Glasgow Philosophy)).
  • 2022. Documentary film: ‘Scotland, African Voices: The Covid19 Vaccine Debate’. (with Josephine Adekola). The documentary aims to address health inequalities and save lives by encouraging vaccine take-up in the Scottish African, Caribbean and Black community, and by highlighting social-epistemological obstacles amongst barriers to vaccination for these communities. Full documentary available here:  https://youtu.be/h1yNAZffpOg Trailer available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ie8SMVvy1Y
    • Partners: Sarah Gilbert and the Vaccine Knowledge Group (University of Oxford), Emma Thompson (the MRC Centre for Virus Research), Deji Bolarinwa (University of Ilorin, Nigeria), Duncan Pritchard (University of California Irvine), Ilan Kelman (University College London, Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction), Jason Leitch (National Clinical Director, the Scottish Government), Claire Cameron (Public Health Scotland), Pastor Yinka and Adefolake Adesina (Fountain of Living Water, RCCG, Ayr), RESPECT Hub Edinburgh, Sharpen Her: the African Women's Network (SHAWM), Glasgow Black and Scot, Aberdeen Jezreel Consultancy.
  • 2022. White Paper: ‘Trust, Disinformation, and Evidence Resistance.’ In response to the UK Parliament Call for Evidence: ‘Fighting Disinformation with Trustworthy Voices’ (with Chris Kelp). Published on the UK Parliament’s website here:
  • https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/111503/pdf/
  • 2022. Ways of Seeing. ARCadia Festival of Ideas, University of Glasgow (with Giovanna Vitelli, Head of Collections, Hunterian Museum).
  • 2022. Panel member: ‘Covid19 Vaccine Hesitancy in African, Black, and Caribbean Communities in Scotland.’ Community/Public Health Scotland/ Scottish Government/Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow public event. Recording available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-akC8rL_yFA.
  • 2022. Interview: ‘Vaccine Hesitancy and Evidence Resistance’. Public Debate Project, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow.
  • 2019-2022. Project Lead: ‘Changing Design, Policy, and Practice in the Wellness Resorts Industry through Philosophy of Functions’ Impact Case, University of Glasgow and Therme Group Austria (externally evaluated at REF 3*-4*, portable)
  • 2021. Panellist, ‘Climate Justice, Risk, and Wellbeing’ public debate, COP26 UK Universities Innovation Showcase, Glasgow, UK.
  • 2021. ‘Knowledge, Justification, and the Lost Anxiety over Regress’. Commentary on ‘What is Knowledge’ debate between Martha Kneale and Allen Phillips Griffiths for the Open University Video Archive Exhibition https://www.open.ac.uk/library/digital-archive/
  • 2021. Interviewed by Janet Anderson for ‘From Different Perspectives: Science, Society, and Communication’, Creating Chemistry
  • 2021. Interviewed by Rebecca O’Dwyer for ‘Living Therme’
  • 2020. Interviewed by Arianna Clark and Ruaridh Gilmartin for UoG ‘Thoughts’ Podcast: ‘Victim Testimony.’ https://www.thoughtsuofg.com/episodes/episode-14-victim-testimony/
  • #YouShouldBelieveHer.’ Invited entry for Alessandra Tanesini’s ‘Open for Debate’ Public Philosophy Blog. https://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/openfordebate/youshouldbelieveher/
  • 2019. Interviewed by Robin Bisson for Research Professional News here: https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-funding-insight-2020-1-my-winning-proposal-permission-to-prioritise-the-big-ideas/
  • 2019. Organiser: ‘Forgiveness and Blame’ Public Roundtable, Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow and Royal Society of Edinburgh.
  • 2019 ‘Evidence and Knowledge’ public talk at the Glasgow – NASA Workshop on Safety Engineering.
  • 2018-2019 Founding Member: Philosophy of Safety Engineering NASA-University of Glasgow Collaboration (PI: Neil McDonnell).
  • 2018. Co-Coordinator: Philosophy Café, Coatbridge Library, Glasgow (with Daniella Meehan).
  • 2018. Organiser: Public Conference on ‘Dimensions of Wellbeing,’ University of Glasgow.
  • 2018. Organiser: Cardiff Philosophy Festival: Ethics and Technology, Sherman Theatre, Cardiff (with Orestis Palermos).
  • 2017. 'The Value of Knowledge’ public lecture at the Philosophy Cafe, Cardiff.
  • 2017. ‘Testimonial Contractarianism’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Public Lecture, Cardiff.
  • 2017. Developer, Royal Institute of Philosophy, Cardiff Branch outreach website, http://www.publicphilosophycardiff.co.uk/.
  • 2017. ‘What is God?’ Roundtable discussion at the ‘Question Everything’ philosophy meet up, The Philharmonic, Cardiff (moderator, with Orestis Palermos)
  • 2017. Organiser: Royal Institute of Philosophy Cardiff Seminar Series (with Orestis Palermos).