Professor Mona Simion

  • Professor of Philosophy (Philosophy)

Biography

I am Professor of Philosophy and Director of the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre. 

I also sit on the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society, Management Committee of the British Society for Theory of Knowledge, the  Steering Committee of the Social Epistemology Network, and on the Editorial Board of the Philosophical Quarterly.

I am the winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021. 

I am Principal Investigator on a major research project entitled 'KnowledegLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology', and funded by a European Research Council 1.5 million Euro grant over 5 years. The project develops a novel research programme for social epistemology (2021-2025).

I am also co-investigator on the Leverhulme Trust-funded  'Virtue Epistemology of Trust' project (2020-2023) and a Principal Investigator on the 'Dimensions of Wellbeing' industry-funded project (2021-2026).

Before this I held a prestigious Mind Research Fellowship from the Mind Association for my 'Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions' project (2018-2019).

I am the author of two monographs – ‘Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context’ (Oxford University Press, 2021) and 'Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion' (with C. Kelp, Cambridge University Press, 2021). 

My edited volume 'Reasons, Justification, and Defeat' (with Jessica Brown) came in 2021 with Oxford University Press. I also have more than 50 articles and book chapters published in internationally leading journals, such as e.g. Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and The Journal of Philosophy and in anthologies of prestigious publishing houses such as Oxford University Press and Cambridge Universiy Press. 

Research interests

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Moral & Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy.
AoC: Social Ontology, Philosophical Methodology, Philosophy of Biology, Media and Communication Theory

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2014
Number of items: 77.

2024

Mace, L. and Simion, M. (2024) What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02247-y) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to Evidence. Series: Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781009298520 (doi: 10.1017/9781009298537)

Simion, M. (2024) Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice. Inquiry, 67(2), pp. 762-768. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2167233) (PMID:38196841) (PMCID:PMC10773469)

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1), pp. 203-216. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964)

Simion, M. and Willard-Kyle, C. (2024) Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 87-101. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2223221)

Simion, M. (2024) Two dilemmas for value sensitive technological design. In: Edwards, M. L. and Palermos, S. O. (eds.) Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies. Series: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 116-128. ISBN 9781032229201 (doi: 10.4324/9781003275992-8)

2023

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2023) What is trustworthiness? Noûs, 57(3), pp. 667-683. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12448)

Simion, M. (2023) Knowledge and disinformation. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2023.25) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Linguistic innovation for gender terms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222155) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Trustworthy artificial intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 8. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00063-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2023) Special Issue: Knowledge-First Epistemology. Synthese. [Edited Journal] (In Press)

2022

Simion, M. (2022) The epistemic normativity of conjecture. Philosophical Studies, 179(11), pp. 3447-3471. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01829-y)

Simion, M. (2022) The Epistemology of Groups. Philosophical Review, 131(4), pp. 537-541. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-10136960)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Sosa on permissible suspension and the proper remit of the theory of knowledge. Res Philosophica, 99(4), pp. 453-466. (doi: 10.11612/resphil.2138)

Simion, M. (2022) Closure, warrant transmission, and defeat. In: Jope, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Closure and Transmission. Routledge. ISBN 9781003104766 (doi: 10.4324/9781003104766-4)

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Simion, M. (2022) Being Rational and Being Right, By Juan Comesaña. Mind, 131(523), pp. 1005-1015. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzab010)[Book Review]

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

Simion, M. (2022) Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, [Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering. In: Damböck, C. and Schiemer, G. (eds.) Carnap Handbuch. Metzler Verlag. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562373) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Defeat. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Engineering evidence. In: Isaac, M. G. and Scharp, K. (eds.) New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge still comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Trusting AI: explainability vs. trustworthiness. In: Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R. (eds.) Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

2021

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Simion, M. (2021) Disagreement and epistemic improvement. Synthese, 199, pp. 14641-14665. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03437-5)

Simion, M. (2021) Blame as performance. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 7595-7614. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03130-7)

Simion, M. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 10371-10388. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z)

Simion, M. (2021) Testimonial contractarianism: a knowledge-first social epistemology. Noûs, 55(4), pp. 891-916. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12337)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009036818 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Simion, M. (2021) Skepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-9)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

Simion, M. (2021) Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pqaa075. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa075)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(3), pp. 681-684. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa048)[Book Review]

Simion, M. I. , Schnurr, J. and Gordon, E. C. (2021) Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3553-3564. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1)

Simion, M. (2021) Assertion compatibilism. In: Kyriacou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.) Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge. ISBN 9780429353468 (doi: 10.4324/9780429353468-18)

Simion, M. (2021) Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192895288

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198847205

Simion, M. (2021) Epistemology. In: Rossberg, M. (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (2021) Introduction. In: Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 1-17. ISBN 9780198847205 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0001)

Simion, M. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2021) Knowledge and disagreement. In: Baghramian, M., Carter, J. A. and Rowland, R. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

2020

Kelp, C. , Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. and Simion, M. (2020) Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5187-5202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Conceptual innovation, function first. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 985-1002. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12302)

Miragoli, M. and Simion, M. (2020) Gender, race, and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 125-138. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-7)

Simion, M. (2020) A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 311-323. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12187)

Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) How to be an anti-reductionist. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2849-2866. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Assertion: the constitutive norms view. In: Goldberg, S. C. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780190675233 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.2)

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (2020) Editorial. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(1), pp. 1-3. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10072-5)

Simion, M. (2020) Social epistemology of education. In: Peters, M. A. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer. ISBN 9789812875327 (doi: 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_696-1)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), pp. 125-137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5)

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2020) Ethics, Knowledge and Language: Selected Papers from the Annual Meeting of the British Society for Ethical Theory 2019. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 23(1) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. and Simion, M. (2020) The ethics and epistemology of trust. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) A social epistemology of assertion. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

2019

Simion, M. (2019) A puzzle for epistemic WAMs. Synthese, 196(11), pp. 4679-4689. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1681-3)

Simion, M. (2019) Knowledge‐first functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), pp. 254-267. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12152)

Simion, M. (2019) Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), pp. 1951-1966. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8)

Simion, M. (2019) Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief-assertion parallel. Analysis, 79(2), pp. 260-265. (doi: 10.1093/analys/any048)

Simion, M. (2019) Assertion: the context shiftiness dilemma. Mind and Language, 34(4), pp. 503-517. (doi: 10.1111/mila.12221)

Simion, M. (2019) Hermeneutical injustice as basing failure. In: Carter, J. A. and Bondy, P. (eds.) Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

2018

Simion, M. (2018) No epistemic norm for action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), pp. 231-238.

Simion, M. (2018) The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), pp. 477-488. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6)

Simion, M. (2018) Epistemic trouble for engineering ‘woman'. Logos and Episteme, 9(1), pp. 91-98.

Simion, M. (2018) The 'should' in conceptual engineering. Inquiry, 61(8), pp. 914-928. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392894)

2017

Simion, M. (2017) Epistemic norms and 'he said/she said' reporting. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 413-422. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.11)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Commodious knowledge. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1487-1502. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0938-3)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), pp. 76-93. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201711426)

2016

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: knowledge is enough. Synthese, 193(10), pp. 3041-3056. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

Simion, M. , Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26, pp. 374-392. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12077)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: just one way to take it back. Logos and Episteme, 7(3), pp. 385-391.

Simion, M. (2016) Non-probabilistic decision strategies behind the veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3), pp. 557-572. (doi: 10.1007/s10790-015-9536-3)

Simion, M. (2016) Perception, history and benefit. Episteme, 13(1), pp. 61-76. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2015.56)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion, knowledge and rational credibility: the scoreboard. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter: Boston, pp. 137-164. ISBN 9783110496345

2014

Simion, M. (2014) Aggregating reasons and persons: on sorting out the logic of the good, Royce’s style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2), pp. 107-121. (doi: 10.1163/18758185-90000293)

This list was generated on Wed Nov 20 17:04:48 2024 GMT.
Jump to: Articles | Books | Book Sections | Book Reviews | Edited Books | Edited Journals
Number of items: 77.

Articles

Mace, L. and Simion, M. (2024) What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02247-y) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2024) Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice. Inquiry, 67(2), pp. 762-768. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2167233) (PMID:38196841) (PMCID:PMC10773469)

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1), pp. 203-216. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964)

Simion, M. and Willard-Kyle, C. (2024) Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 87-101. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2223221)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2023) What is trustworthiness? Noûs, 57(3), pp. 667-683. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12448)

Simion, M. (2023) Knowledge and disinformation. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2023.25) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Linguistic innovation for gender terms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222155) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Trustworthy artificial intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 8. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00063-5)

Simion, M. (2022) The epistemic normativity of conjecture. Philosophical Studies, 179(11), pp. 3447-3471. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01829-y)

Simion, M. (2022) Sosa on permissible suspension and the proper remit of the theory of knowledge. Res Philosophica, 99(4), pp. 453-466. (doi: 10.11612/resphil.2138)

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562373) (Early Online Publication)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Simion, M. (2021) Disagreement and epistemic improvement. Synthese, 199, pp. 14641-14665. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03437-5)

Simion, M. (2021) Blame as performance. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 7595-7614. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03130-7)

Simion, M. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 10371-10388. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z)

Simion, M. (2021) Testimonial contractarianism: a knowledge-first social epistemology. Noûs, 55(4), pp. 891-916. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12337)

Simion, M. I. , Schnurr, J. and Gordon, E. C. (2021) Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3553-3564. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1)

Kelp, C. , Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. and Simion, M. (2020) Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5187-5202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Conceptual innovation, function first. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 985-1002. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12302)

Simion, M. (2020) A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 311-323. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12187)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) How to be an anti-reductionist. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2849-2866. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y)

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (2020) Editorial. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(1), pp. 1-3. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10072-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), pp. 125-137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5)

Carter, J. A. and Simion, M. (2020) The ethics and epistemology of trust. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Simion, M. (2019) A puzzle for epistemic WAMs. Synthese, 196(11), pp. 4679-4689. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1681-3)

Simion, M. (2019) Knowledge‐first functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), pp. 254-267. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12152)

Simion, M. (2019) Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), pp. 1951-1966. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8)

Simion, M. (2019) Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief-assertion parallel. Analysis, 79(2), pp. 260-265. (doi: 10.1093/analys/any048)

Simion, M. (2019) Assertion: the context shiftiness dilemma. Mind and Language, 34(4), pp. 503-517. (doi: 10.1111/mila.12221)

Simion, M. (2018) No epistemic norm for action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), pp. 231-238.

Simion, M. (2018) The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), pp. 477-488. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6)

Simion, M. (2018) Epistemic trouble for engineering ‘woman'. Logos and Episteme, 9(1), pp. 91-98.

Simion, M. (2018) The 'should' in conceptual engineering. Inquiry, 61(8), pp. 914-928. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392894)

Simion, M. (2017) Epistemic norms and 'he said/she said' reporting. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 413-422. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.11)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Commodious knowledge. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1487-1502. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0938-3)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), pp. 76-93. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201711426)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: knowledge is enough. Synthese, 193(10), pp. 3041-3056. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

Simion, M. , Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26, pp. 374-392. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12077)

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: just one way to take it back. Logos and Episteme, 7(3), pp. 385-391.

Simion, M. (2016) Non-probabilistic decision strategies behind the veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3), pp. 557-572. (doi: 10.1007/s10790-015-9536-3)

Simion, M. (2016) Perception, history and benefit. Episteme, 13(1), pp. 61-76. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2015.56)

Simion, M. (2014) Aggregating reasons and persons: on sorting out the logic of the good, Royce’s style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2), pp. 107-121. (doi: 10.1163/18758185-90000293)

Books

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to Evidence. Series: Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781009298520 (doi: 10.1017/9781009298537)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009036818 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Simion, M. (2021) Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192895288

Book Sections

Simion, M. (2024) Two dilemmas for value sensitive technological design. In: Edwards, M. L. and Palermos, S. O. (eds.) Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies. Series: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 116-128. ISBN 9781032229201 (doi: 10.4324/9781003275992-8)

Simion, M. (2022) Closure, warrant transmission, and defeat. In: Jope, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Closure and Transmission. Routledge. ISBN 9781003104766 (doi: 10.4324/9781003104766-4)

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering. In: Damböck, C. and Schiemer, G. (eds.) Carnap Handbuch. Metzler Verlag. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Defeat. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Engineering evidence. In: Isaac, M. G. and Scharp, K. (eds.) New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge still comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Trusting AI: explainability vs. trustworthiness. In: Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R. (eds.) Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2021) Skepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-9)

Simion, M. (2021) Assertion compatibilism. In: Kyriacou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.) Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge. ISBN 9780429353468 (doi: 10.4324/9780429353468-18)

Simion, M. (2021) Epistemology. In: Rossberg, M. (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (2021) Introduction. In: Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 1-17. ISBN 9780198847205 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0001)

Simion, M. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2021) Knowledge and disagreement. In: Baghramian, M., Carter, J. A. and Rowland, R. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Miragoli, M. and Simion, M. (2020) Gender, race, and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 125-138. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-7)

Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Assertion: the constitutive norms view. In: Goldberg, S. C. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780190675233 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.2)

Simion, M. (2020) Social epistemology of education. In: Peters, M. A. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer. ISBN 9789812875327 (doi: 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_696-1)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) A social epistemology of assertion. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2019) Hermeneutical injustice as basing failure. In: Carter, J. A. and Bondy, P. (eds.) Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion, knowledge and rational credibility: the scoreboard. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter: Boston, pp. 137-164. ISBN 9783110496345

Book Reviews

Simion, M. (2022) The Epistemology of Groups. Philosophical Review, 131(4), pp. 537-541. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-10136960)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Being Rational and Being Right, By Juan Comesaña. Mind, 131(523), pp. 1005-1015. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzab010)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, [Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pqaa075. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa075)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(3), pp. 681-684. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa048)[Book Review]

Edited Books

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198847205

Edited Journals

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2023) Special Issue: Knowledge-First Epistemology. Synthese. [Edited Journal] (In Press)

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2020) Ethics, Knowledge and Language: Selected Papers from the Annual Meeting of the British Society for Ethical Theory 2019. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 23(1) [Edited Journal]

This list was generated on Wed Nov 20 17:04:48 2024 GMT.

Grants

Total: GBP 2,224,092

 

2021: Young Epistemologist Prize 2021 (USD 1,000). Awarded by: Rutgers University.

2021-2025: ERC Starting Grant: ‘KNOWLEDGELAB: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology (EUR 1,470,000). Awarded by: the European Research Council 

2020-2023: Research Grant: ‘A Virtue Epistemology of Trust’ (GBP 254,871). Awarded by: Leverhulme Trust, UK (Co-I, with A. Carter and C. Kelp)

2020-2025: Impact & Research Industry Grant: ‘Dimensions of Wellbeing’ (GBP 332,075). Awarded by: Therme Group, Austria (PI, with C. Kelp).

2019: Conference Grant: ‘European Epistemology Network Meeting 2020’ (GBP 1.500) Awarded by: Mind Association (with C. Kelp).

2019: Conference Grant: ‘European Epistemology Network Meeting 2020’ (GBP 1.500) Awarded by: Scots Philosophical Association (with C. Kelp).

2019: Conference Grant: ‘Perception: Epistemology and Mind’ (GBP 1.500). Awarded by: Scots Philosophical Association (with D. Brown).

2019: Conference & Knowledge Exchange Grant: ‘Dimensions of Wellbeing.’ (GBP 3.600). Awarded by: Therme Group and University of Glasgow (with A. Carter and C. Kelp).

2019: Network Grant: ‘Blame and Responsibility’ (GBP 10,000). Awarded by: Royal Society of Edinburgh (Key Contributor, with Jessica Brown (PI), A. Carter, C. Kelp, E. Mason, A. McGlynn, P. Todd (Co-Key Contributors))

2019: Conference Grant: Glasgow Graduate Conference in Epistemology and Mind (GBP 3000). Awarded by: Analysis Trust, Scots Philosophical Association, Mind Association (with J. Corns).

2019: Knowledge Exchange and Impact Grant: Wellbeing (GBP 2,400). Awarded by: Therme Group and University of Glasgow (with A. Carter and C. Kelp).

2018: Conference Grant: ‘European Normativity Network Meeting 2018’ (GBP 1,800) Awarded by: Analysis Trust and Scots Philosophical Association (with R. Cowan and C. Kelp).

2018: Research Fellowship: ‘Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions’ (GBP 23,000). Awarded by: The Mind Association.

2018: Conference Grant: ‘Knowledge First: Themes from Tim Williamson’ (GBP 4,700). Awarded by: The Mind Association, the Analysis Trust and Cardiff University.

2017: Conference Grant: ‘1st Social Epistemology Network Event’ (EUR 15,000) Awarded by: Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo.

2017: Postdoctoral Research Fellowship: ‘Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms’ (EUR 140,000). Awarded by: Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature and ConceptLab, University of Oslo.

2016: Visiting Fellowship: ‘JuMo Early Career Mobility Funding’ (EUR 14,500). 9 months research stay at UC Riverside and UC Irvine. Awarded by: KU Leuven. Sponsors: Peter Graham and Sven Bernecker.

2016: Conference Grant: ‘Epistemic Norms’ (EUR 4,500). Awarded by: FWO (Research Foundation Flanders) and Van de Wielefonds.

Supervision

I am happy to supervise PhD projects in epistemology, philosophy of language, moral & political philosophy, and feminist philosophy, as well as at their intersection.

Postdocs

2020-2023 Emma Gordon (epistemology, bioethics)

2021-2026 Christopher Willard Kyle (epistemology, ethics of wellbeing)

2021-2022 Matthew Jope (epistemology)

 

PhD students

2021-2026 Nina Kojima (ethics, political philosophy)

2020-2024 Isak Andri Olafsson (virtue epistemology, trust)

2020-2024 Paul Irikefe (philosophical methodology, epistemology (external supervisor, Cardiff University))

2020-2021 Sam Kang (conceptual engineering (external supervisor, Carnegie Mellon University))

2020-2024 Yasmeen Hindawi (feminist philosophy of language, social ontology)

2019-2023 Shweta Pandey (feminist epistemology)

2018-2022 Daniella Meehan (blame, vice epistemology)

2018-2022 Martin Miragoli (social epistemology, hinge epistemology)

2017 – 2023 Daniela Rusu (feminist epistemology, feminist philosophy of language)

2016-2020 Maria Mendez (political philosophy)

2017 – 2018 Paul Hampson (conceptual engineering)

Teaching

Areas of Competence: epistemology, philosophy of language, moral philosophy, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, philosophical methodology, social ontology, logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, history of analytic.

   

Undergraduate

PHIL 1010: Philosophy 1A: How Can I Know? 

SH12: Gender & Race 

 

Postgraduate

MSc Feminist Philosophy 

MSc Philosophy of Language 

MSc Research Methods

MSc Conversion Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Professional activities & recognition

Research fellowships

  • 2019 - 2019: Mind Research Fellowship, UK
  • 2017 - 2017: CSMN & ConceptLab Postdoctoral Fellowship, Norway
  • 2016 - 2017: JUMO Mobility Fellowship, Belgium
  • 2013 - 2017: FWO & BOF PhD Fellowship, Belgium

Editorial boards

  • 2018: Philosophical Quarterly

Professional & learned societies

  • 2017: Steering Committee Member, Social Epistemology Network
  • 2017: Member, European Normativity Network
  • 2018: Member, Epistemology of Education Network
  • 2018: Member, Philosophy of Blame Network
  • 2018: Member, Higher Order Evidence Network
  • 2019: Management Committee member, British Society for the Theory of Knowledge
  • 2019: Member, Philosophy of Risk network

Additional information

Impact & Outreach

PI: ‘Dimensions of Wellbeing and Architecture’ Impact Case, University of Glasgow and Therme Group, Austria

‘#YouShouldBelieveHer.’ Invited Entry for ‘Open for Debate’: 

Interviewed by Robin Bisson for Research Professional News here. 

Organiser: ‘Forgiveness and Blame’ Public Roundtable, Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow and Royal Society of Edinburgh.

‘Evidence and Knowledge’ public talk at the Glasgow – NASA Workshop on Safety Engineering.

Organiser: Public Conference on ‘Dimensions of Wellbeing,’ University of Glasgow.

Organiser: Cardiff Philosophy Festival: Ethics and Technology, Sherman Theatre, Cardiff (with Orestis Palermos).

'The Value of Knowledge'; public lecture at the Philosophy Cafe, Cardiff.

‘Testimonial Contractarianism’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Public Lecture, Cardiff University.

‘What is God?.’ Roundtable discussion at the ‘Question Everything’ philosophy meet up, The Philharmonic, Cardiff (moderator).

Co-Organiser: Royal Institute of Philosophy Cardiff Seminar Series.