Epistemic Norms, Functions and Virtues
Published: 25 November 2019
4-5 December 2019
4-5 December 2019
For some epistemologists, obtaining epistemic goods is a matter of following the correct epistemic norms. According to others, one’s positive epistemic status must be understood by looking at the function of our cognitive faculties, whereas others hold that they result from the exercise of our intellectual virtues. Each of these strategies plays a crucial role in contemporary epistemological debates about e.g. the nature of knowledge and justification, epistemic permissibility and responsibility. The aim of the workshop is to investigate the relationship between epistemic norms, epistemic functions and epistemic virtues, by bringing together experts in each of these areas and sketch a new prospect of research at their intersection.
Speakers
- Peter Graham (UC Riverside)
- Patrick Greenough (St. Andrews)
- Michael Hannon (Nottingham)
- Jonathan Jenkins-Ichikawa (British Columbia)
- Anne-Kathrin Koch (Vienna)
- Ema Sullivan-Bissett (Birmingham)
- Mona Simion (Glasgow)
Conference location
The Reid Room, Philosophy Department, 69 Oakfield Avenue, University of Glasgow, G12 8QQ.
Sponsors
Analysis Trust, Mind Association, Scots Philosophical Association
Organisers
On behalf of COGITO Epistemology Group at Glasgow:
- Emma Gordon
- Daniella Meehan
- Martin Miragoli
Accessibility
The conference will adopt the general principles and guidelines of Minorities and Philosophy. We guarantee that the conference venue will be accessible to all speakers and members of the audience. For accessibility information about the venue and personalised accessibility requests, please contact Martin Miragoli
First published: 25 November 2019
