Microtheory Seminar Series. "Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive-Form Games: The Two-Player Case and Ideas for Generalization"
Published: 10 March 2025
22 April 2025. Dr Lucas Pahl, University of Sheffield
Dr Lucas Pahl, University of Sheffield
"Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive-Form Games: The Two-Player Case and Ideas for Generalization"
Tuesday, 22 April 2025. 16:00-17:30
Room 141A, Adam Smith Business School
Abstract
We prove the 2-player, generic extensive-form case of the conjecture of Govindan and Wilson (1997a,b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is essential in every equivalent game if and only if the index of the component is nonzero. This provides an index-theoretic characterization of the concept of hyperstable components of equilibria in generic extensive-form games, first formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). We also illustrate how to compute hyperstable equilibria in multiple economically relevant examples and show how the predictions of hyperstability compare with other solution concepts.
Bio
I am a Mathematical Game Theorist interested in foundational questions in game theory and their connections with topology and algebraic geometry. I obtained my PhD in 2019 under the supervision of Hari Govindan and Paulo Barelli, at the University of Rochester. I am an Assistant Professor (Lecturer) at the University of Sheffield.
For further information, please contact business-seminar-series@glasgow.ac.uk.
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First published: 10 March 2025