Microtheory Seminar Series. "Stable Matching as Transportation" (Joint Work with Joseph Root and Fedor Sandomirskiy)
Published: 17 February 2025
25 March 2025. Dr Federico Echenique, University of California, Berkeley
Dr Federico Echenique, University of California, Berkeley
"Stable Matching as Transportation" (Joint Work with Joseph Root and Fedor Sandomirskiy)
Tuesday, 25 March 2025. 16:00-17:30
Room 141A, Adam Smith Business School
Abstract
We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between common design objectives -- stability, efficiency, and fairness -- and the theory of optimal transport. Optimal transport gives new insights into the structural properties of matchings obtained from pursuing these objectives, and into the trade-offs between different objectives. Matching markets with aligned preferences provide a tractable stylized model capturing supply-demand imbalances in a range of settings such as partnership formation, school choice, organ donor exchange, and markets with transferable utility where bargaining over transfers happens after a match is formed.
Bio
Federico Echenique is a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He works on economic theory and mathematical economics. He is most active on allocation and matching problems, as well as revealed preference and decision theory.
For further information, please contact business-seminar-series@glasgow.ac.uk.
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First published: 17 February 2025