Applied Economics Seminar Series. "Marriage Market Equilibrium with Matching on Latent Ability: Identification using a Compulsory Schooling Expansion"
Published: 16 February 2024
28 February. Professor Jesper Bagger, University of Edinburgh
Professor Jesper Bagger, University of Edinburgh
"Marriage Market Equilibrium with Matching on Latent Ability: Identification using a Compulsory Schooling Expansion"
Wednesday, 28 February. 3 p.m.
Room 250 Gilbert Scott Building
Abstract
We use a well known UK compulsory schooling expansion - the 1972 Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) - to identify and estimate an equilibrium marriage market model with sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability. Our identification hinges on a RoSLA-induced discontinuity in the distribution of qualifications. Since the distribution of ability is unaffected by the RoSLA, we can disentangle the contributions of qualification and ability to marital surplus. Both are valued and are complements in the marital surplus function. Ability increases the probability of ever marrying while basic qualification attainment does not. Hence, the observed marriage gap between basic qualified and unqualified individuals is entirely due to selection on ability. The RoSLA worsened marital prospects of low ability individuals through general equilibrium effects.
Bio
Jesper is an empirically orientated economist with research interests in labour and macro-labour economics, family economics and public economics.
For further information, please contact business-school-research@glasgow.ac.uk
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First published: 16 February 2024