Microtheory Seminar Series. "Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Juries: Acquitting the Guilty (with Alexander Winter)"
Published: 30 September 2024
01 October 2024. Dr Deniz Kattwinkel, University College London
Dr Deniz Kattwinkel, University College London
"Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Juries: Acquitting the Guilty (with Alexander Winter)"
Tuesday, 01 October 2024. 16:00-17:30
Room 141A, Adam Smith Business School Building
Abstract
A group of privately informed agents has to choose between two alternatives. How should a principal design the decision rule if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question within the classical Condorcet jury setting. Applications include the optimal decision mechanisms for boards of directors, political committees, and trial juries. The optimal mechanism is a non-monotonic voting mechanism. In the terminology of the court example, when jurors are more eager to convict than the lawmaker (principal), then the optimal mechanism convicts the defendant if and only if neither too many nor to few jurors vote to convict. This kind of mechanism accords with a judicial procedure from ancient Jewish law as recorded in the Talmud.
Bio
Lecturer of economics at UCL. Research in micro economic theory in particular mechanism design.
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First published: 30 September 2024
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