Adam Smith Business School

Professor Shigehiro Serizawa and Yuya Wakabayashi, University of Osaka

"A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices"
Tuesday, 27 February. 16:00
Room 355 Gilbert Scott Buiding

Abstract

We consider the economy consisting of n agents and m heterogeneous objects where the seller benefits v from objects. Our study focuses on the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). In the situation with arbitrary n, m and v, we show that the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices adjusted to v on the classical domain is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no-subsidy. Our result is an extension of that of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), and so we can consider more general situation than them. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness and two-sided individual rationality.

Bio

Professor Shigehiro Serizawa Since he obtained PhD from the University of Rochester in 1993, he worked on mechanism design and market design, especially on strategy-proofness.

Yuya Wakabayashi  4th year PhD student at Osaka University. His research field is mechanism design.

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First published: 19 January 2024