Adam Smith Business School

Professor Yuan Ju, University of York

"Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining"
Tuesday, 10 October. 4 pm
Room 355. Gilbert Scott Building (Main Building)

Abstract

We present a decentralized mechanism of multilateral negotiation that allows every player to make a proposal as well as accommodates counteroffers and partial agreements. Only local unanimity is required for reaching an agreement, and players are not excluded even if their proposals have been rejected, both being key relevant features in most real-life negotiations. The role of the planner becomes minimal in our mechanism compared to those in the literature. This leads to a new solution theory that synthesizes the alternating-offer bargaining model a la Rubinstein (1982) and
the general non-transferable utility environment with n players, which strategically establishes the Nash bargaining solution for pure bargaining problems, the Shapley value for transferable utility games, and in particular, the Shapley NTU value for nontransferable utility games.

Bio

Yuan Ju works in game theory and microeconomics, with a focus on the topics of bargaining, externality, distributive justice and the Nash programme, adopting normative, positive and experimental approaches. He completed his undergraduate and postgraduate studies at Shandong University in China and PhD at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He joined Keele University in 2005 and then moved to the University of York in 2007.

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First published: 17 August 2023