Adam Smith Business School

Dr Tatiana Kornienko, King's College

“Competitive Bidding, Predation, and Expropriation: A Unified Model”
Tuesday, 12 December. 4 pm
Room 281 Adam Smith Business School

Abstract

The paper presents a unified theoretical model of expropriation auctions which accommodates standard auctions and wallet games, as well as novel property reassignment games where each player bids to acquire the heterogeneous assets of all bidders, net of total bidding expenditures. Even though the winner's prize in expropriation auctions is endogenous, the equilibrium bidders' payoff in a frictionless world is identical to that in standard single-object independent private value auctions, extending the payoff equivalence result to a wider class of competitive situations.

Bio

Tatiana Kornienko is a Reader in Economics at King's College London (King’s Business School), having worked previously at the University of Edinburgh. Her research interests include behavioural and experimental economics and applied game theory. Tatiana has been exploring aspects of auction theory, relative comparisons, inter-personal competition, concerns with social status, social learning, and behavioural inattention. Her work has been published in economics journals including American Economic Review, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and European Economic Review. Tatiana holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh.

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First published: 30 October 2023