Adam Smith Business School

Dr Artyom Jelnov, Ariel University

"Lobbying under conflicting interests"
Tuesday, 24 October. 4 pm
Room Room 411. Boyd Orr Building

Abstract

A variation of the cheap talk game is considered in which the preferences of a special interest group conflict with those of a policymaker if she is benevolent; however, she may be corrupt. The interest group, which knows the state of the world, sends a message to the policymaker and may also exert costly lobbying efforts for its preferred policy to be adopted. We show that expected welfare, which is the same in all PBEs, is decreasing in the probability that the policymaker is corrupt. Surprisingly, it decreases faster when this probability is above one-half, suggesting that corrupt behaviour will be tolerated only up to a certain level. (With Doron Klunover)

Bio

I am a senior lecturer at the Ariel University, Israel. I obtained my PhD degree from the Tel Aviv University in 2014. Currently, I am a visiting scholar at Brunel University, London. My current research interest is applied theory, especially the political economy and in industrial organization.

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First published: 4 September 2023