Microeconomics
About us
The Microeconomics Research Cluster focuses on the behaviour of individuals and on institutions allocating scarce resources. Microeconomists at the Adam Smith Business School studies market failures arising from asymmetric information, default and miscoordination of expectations, as well as non traditional markets like electronic commerce, or markets without money, such as reputation systems on the internet and the assignment of students to schools. They examine the normative foundations of decision making under uncertainty and behavioural biases together with related empirical paradoxes. They apply this methodology to the empirical analysis of oligopolistic markets, of behavioural poverty traps, disease prevalence, crime, copyright, and more.
Leadership and members
Economics Lunchtime Seminar Series 2024-2025
The Economics Lunchtime Seminar Series enables academic staff and doctoral researchers to share their work with colleagues. Abstracts and speaker biographies for upcoming seminars are available on our Research Seminars webpage. For further information about the series, please contact the ASBS Seminar Series team.
Economics Lunchtime Seminar Series 2024-2025
Wednesday, 20 November 2024. 13:00
Professor Masashige Hamano, Waseda University
Wednesday, 05 March 2025. 13:00
Dr Konstantinos Georgalos, Lancaster University
Wednesday, 12 March 2025. 13:00
Professor Jakub Steiner, Zurich University and Cerge-Ei
Friday, 09 May 2025. 13:00
Dr Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
We foster a positive and productive environment for seminars through our Code of conduct.
Microtheory Seminar Series 2024-2025
The microtheorists of the Adam Smith Business School welcome distinguished speakers from worldwide institutions to present their latest research. Abstracts and speaker biographies for upcoming seminars are available on our Research Seminars webpage.
Our seminars are open to all. For further details or to subscribe to seminar announcements, please contact the ASBS Seminar Series team.
Microtheory Seminar Series 2024-2025
Tuesday, 17 September 2024. 16:00
Dr Costas Cavounidis, University of Warwick
Tuesday, 01 October 2024. 16:00
Dr Deniz Kattwinkel, University College London
Tuesday, 08 October 2024. 16:00
Professor Flavio Toxvaerd, University of Cambridge
Tuesday, 22 October 2024. 16:00
Dr Elias Tsakas, Maastricht University
Tuesday, 29 October 2024. 16:00
Dr Agustin Troccoli-Moretti, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)
Wednesday, 30 October 2024. 13:00
Professor Eilon Solan, Tel-Aviv University, Israel
Tuesday, 12 November 2024. 16:00
Professor Marco Mariotti, Queen Mary University of London
Tuesday, 19 November 2024. 16:00
Professor Andriy Zapechelnyuk, University of Edinburgh
Friday, 29 November 2024. 14:30
Professor Alex Gershkov, Hebrew University and University of Surrey
Tuesday, 03 December 2024. 16:00
Professor Jerome Renault, Toulouse University
Tuesday, 10 December 2024. 16:00
Professor Ariel Rubinstein, Tel-Aviv University and NYU
Tuesday, 17 December 2024. 16:00
Professor John Moore, University of Edinburgh
Tuesday, 18 February 2025. 16:00
Professor Martin Cripps, University College London
Tuesday, 25 February 2025. 16:00
Dr Christian Basteck, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Tuesday, 04 March 2025. 16:00
Dr Omer Edhan, University of Manchester
Tuesday, 18 March 2025. 16:00
Dr Conal Duddy, University College Cork
Tuesday, 25 March 2025. 16:00
Professor Federico Echenique, UC Berkeley
Wednesday, 26 March 2025. 14:00 (Cancelled)
Professor Ella Segev, the Hebrew University Business School
Tuesday, 22 April 2025. 16:00
Dr Lucas Pahl, University of Sheffield
Tuesday, 29 April 2025. 16:00
Dr Larbi Alaoui, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Tuesday, 06 May 2025. 16:00
Dr Alexei Parakhonyak, University of Oxford
Tuesday, 13 May 2025. 16:00
Professor John Quah, National University of Singapore
Tuesday, 20 May 2025. 16:00
Professor Ludovic Renou, Queen Mary University of London
Tuesday, 27 May 2025. 16:00
Dr Elizabeth Baldwin, Oxford University
We foster a positive and productive environment for seminars through our Code of conduct.
Impact and engagement
Learn about our projects and activities
NHS fraud recovery
Professor Sayantan Ghosal and Dr Theodore Koutmeridis have worked with NHS Scotland to increase cash recoveries and save public money. Incorrectly claimed payment exemptions for dental and ophthalmic treatments previously cost NHS Scotland approximately £10 million per year. Using theoretical and empirical-based research, Professor Ghosal and Dr Koutmeridis collaborated with NHS Scotland on an initiative that increased cash recoveries by £580,000 during the pilot phase and ultimately changed the NHS’s practice and culture.
Related links
Disadvantage and participation accountability processes in India
Using theory and evidence from school development and management committees in Karnataka, India, Professor Sayantan Ghosal and Dr Theodore Koutmeridis have developed a conceptual framework to examine how poverty, marginalisation and exclusion impact on the beliefs and agency of parents, and to assess the impact of a pro-poor accountability framework. The project will lead to the development of training programmes tailored to encourage participation by disadvantaged groups in social accountability processes. Professor Michele Schweisfurth (Education), Dr Patricio Dalton (Tilburg School of Economics), and Dr Sanchari Roy (King’s College London) are co-investigators on this interdisciplinary ESRC-funded research project.
Publications
2025
Levy, Y. J. (2025) Independence of existence of measurable equilibrium selections. Israel Journal of Mathematics, (doi: 10.1007/s11856-025-2729-y)
2024
Hayashi, T. (2024) Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 115, (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050)
Chambers, C. P., Gerasimou, G. (2024) Non-diversified portfolios with subjective expected utility. Economics Letters, 244, (doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112036)
Gerasimou, G. (2024) Characterization of the Jaccard dissimilarity metric and a generalization. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 355, pp. 57-61. (doi: 10.1016/j.dam.2024.04.022)
Levy, Y. J. (2024) Bayesian equilibrium: from local to global. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 113, (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103012)
Levy, Y. J., Veiga, A. (2024) Optimal contract regulation in selection markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Bogomolnaia, A. (2024) On slots' scheduling. Economic Theory, 77, pp. 653-674. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-023-01508-x)
Hayashi, T., Kiguchi, N., Takeoka, N. (2024) Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 26, (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12674)
2023
Levy, Y. J. (2023) Slicing the Nash equilibrium manifold. Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications, 25, (doi: 10.1007/s11784-023-01088-2)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H. (2023) Guarantees in fair division: general or monotone preferences. Mathematics of Operations Research, 48, pp. 160-176. (doi: 10.1287/moor.2022.1255)
Bogomolnaia, A., Holzman, R., Moulin, H. (2023) On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators. Theoretical Economics, 18, pp. 97-127. (doi: 10.3982/TE4832)
2022
Hayashi, T., Takeoka, N. (2022) Habit formation, self-deception, and self-control. Economic Theory, 74, pp. 547-592. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-022-01445-1)
Costa-Gomes, M., Cueva, C., Gerasimou, G., Tejiščák, M. (2022) Choice, deferral, and consistency. Quantitative Economics, 13, pp. 1297-1318. (doi: 10.3982/qe1806)
Diasakos, T., Gerasimou, G. (2022) Preference conditions for invertible demand functions. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14, pp. 113-138. (doi: 10.1257/mic.20190262)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2022) Dense orbits of the Bayesian updating group action. Mathematics of Operations Research, 47, pp. 384-396. (doi: 10.1287/moor.2021.1134)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2022) Equilibria existence in Bayesian games: climbing the countable Borel equivalence relation hierarchy. Mathematics of Operations Research, 47, pp. 367-383. (doi: 10.1287/moor.2021.1135)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F. (2022) On the fair division of a random object. Management Science, 68, pp. 1174-1194. (doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.3973)
Levy, Y. J. (2022) Uniformly supported approximate equilibria in families of games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 98, (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102571)
Hayashi, T. (2022) Envy-free solution under unequal labour skills. Communications in Economics and Mathematical Sciences, 1, pp. 23-37. (doi: 10.50906/cems.1.0_23)
2021
Hanaki, N., Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M., Ogawa, K. (2021) Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: an experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 190, pp. 366-389. (doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.038)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2021) Social discount rate: spaces for agreement. Economic Theory Bulletin, 9, pp. 247-257. (doi: 10.1007/s40505-021-00209-9)
Hayashi, T. (2021) Collective decision under ignorance. Social Choice and Welfare, 57, pp. 347-359. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-021-01320-3)
Levy, Y. J. (2021) An update on continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration. Dynamic Games and Applications, 11, pp. 418-432. (doi: 10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0)
Levy, Y. J., Veiga, A. (2021) Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost. Journal of Economic Theory, 192, (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105198)
Gerasimou, G. (2021) Simple preference intensity comparisons. Journal of Economic Theory, 192, (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105199)
2020
Levy, Y. J. (2020) On games without approximate equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 49, pp. 1125-1128. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-020-00734-0)
Levy, Y. J., Veiga, A. (2020) On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 124, pp. 140-168. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.016)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2020) Can everyone benefit from economic integration? Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22, pp. 821-833. (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12420)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2020) Can everyone benefit from innovation? Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, pp. 187-191. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.001)
Hayashi, T. (2020) Investment in time preference and long-run distribution. Japanese Economic Review, 71, pp. 171-190. (doi: 10.1007/s42973-019-00021-y)
Hayashi, T. (2020) Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a labour production economy with unequal skills. Japanese Economic Review, 71, pp. 221-232. (doi: 10.1111/jere.12222)
Levy, Y. J., Solan, E. (2020) Stochastic games. Springer
2019
Gerasimou, G. (2019) Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences. Economic Theory Bulletin, 7, pp. 165-171. (doi: 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2)
Hayashi, T. (2019) What should society maximise under uncertainty? Japanese Economic Review, 70, pp. 446-478. (doi: 10.1111/jere.12230)
Hayashi, T. (2019) Self-fulfilling regression and statistical discrimination. International Journal of Economic Theory, 15, pp. 289-295. (doi: 10.1111/ijet.12190)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2019) Constrained implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 183, pp. 546-567. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.007)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2019) One-step-ahead implementation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 83, pp. 110-126. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.007)
Aziz, H., Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H. (2019) Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous Preferences. (doi: 10.1145/3328526.3329552)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2019) Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements. Economic Theory, 67, pp. 775-816. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-017-1097-1)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., Yanovskaia, E. (2019) Dividing bads under additive utilities. Social Choice and Welfare, 52, pp. 395-417. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2019) Measurable selection for purely atomic games. Econometrica, 87, pp. 593-629. (doi: 10.3982/ecta15479)
2018
Gerasimou, G., Tejiščák, M. (2018) Prest: open-source software for computational revealed preference analysis. Journal of Open Source Software, 3, (doi: 10.21105/joss.01015)
Gerasimou, G. (2018) Indecisiveness, undesirability and overload revealed through rational choice deferral. Economic Journal, 128, pp. 2161-2557. (doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12500)
Bogomolnaia, A. (2018) The most ordinally-egalitarian of random voting rules. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 20, pp. 271-276. (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12258)
Gerasimou, G. (2018) On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences. Economics Letters, 164, pp. 24-26. (doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.037)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2018) Reverse Bayesianism: a comment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10, pp. 315-324. (doi: 10.1257/mic.20160187)
Gerasimou, G., Papi, M. (2018) Duopolistic competition with choice-overloaded consumers. European Economic Review, (doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.002)
2017
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2017) Resource allocation with partial responsibilities for initial endowments. International Journal of Economic Theory, 13, pp. 355-368. (doi: 10.1111/ijet.12133)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., Yanovskaya, E. (2017) Competitive division of a mixed manna. Econometrica, 85, pp. 1847-1871. (doi: 10.3982/ECTA14564)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2017) Bayesian games with a continuum of states. Theoretical Economics, 12, pp. 1089-1120. (doi: 10.3982/TE1544)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2017) Gains from trade. International Economic Review, 58, pp. 923-942. (doi: 10.1111/iere.12240)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2017) Implementation in partial equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 169, pp. 13-34. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.008)
2016
Hayashi, T. (2016) Consistent updating of social welfare functions. Social Choice and Welfare, 46, pp. 569-608. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-015-0929-9)
Levy, Y. J. (2016) Projections and functions of Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 45, pp. 435-459. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-015-0517-3)
Gerasimou, G. (2016) Asymmetric dominance, deferral, and status quo bias in a behavioral model of choice. Theory and Decision, 80, pp. 295-312. (doi: 10.1007/s11238-015-9499-7)
Gerasimou, G. (2016) Partially dominant choice. Economic Theory, 61, pp. 127-145. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-015-0869-8)