Adam Smith Business School

Professor Marie Laclau-Vigeral, CNRS / HEC

'Communication on Networks and Strong Reliability' (joint work with Ludovic Renou and Xavier Venel)
Tuesday 22 March 2022, 1pm - 2.15pm
Zoom online seminar

Register at business-events@glasgow.ac.uk

Abstract

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distinct nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the receiver is thus indirect. We prove that it is possible to implement all the communication equilibrium outcomes of the direct communication game (i.e equilibrium outcomes of the mediated communication between the sender and the receiver, when the communication between the sender and the receiver is intermediated by a mediator), as weak perfect Bayesian outcomes of the indirect and unmediated communication game, if, and only if, there are (at least) two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver. Precluding direct communication may therefore help in achieving better outcomes. 

Biography

Marie Laclau is a CNRS researcher and associate professor (education track) at HEC Paris. Her research interests lie in game theory and economic theory. After a PhD (defended in 2012) devoted to the study of strategic communication and repeated games played on networks, she has been focusing on information design, especially in dynamic environments. She has also worked on dynamic strategic communication. She joined the CNRS in 2013 after a post-doctorate at Yale University and was first affiliated at Paris School of Economics, then at HEC since 2018.

---

Further information: business-events@glasgow.ac.uk 

First published: 7 March 2022