Blog by Dr Petar Bankov, Lecturer in Politics, University of Glasgow

On 23 February Germany will hold its federal elections. These will be just the fourth snap elections in the country’s post-war history following the collapse of the tri-partisan centre-left coalition between social democrats (SPD), Greens, and liberals (FDP) in early November 2024. Current polls indicate that it is the centre-right Christian democrats (CDU/CSU) that would top the vote with around 30%, whereas the biggest winner of these elections might be the populist radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD). The AfD almost doubles its support since 2021, currently polling around 20% with the high chance of being the second biggest party in the Bundestag. Beyond these actors, two minor radical left parties, the Left (Die Linke) and the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), also have chances to enter parliament.

So far media reports on these elections tend to focus particularly on the rise of the AfD and its implications for future governance. Such rise was long time in the making, as it emerged in a perfect storm underpinned by the long-term challenges to the German state around mending the socio-economic inequalities and cultural differences between Western and Eastern Germany following the Reunification in 1990 and the gradual institutional decay of the consensus-based, elite-guided political system of the Bonn and Berlin Republic. On top of these come the lasting economic difficulties following the Great Recession and the war in Ukraine and the associated social challenges to it, as well as the increasing pressures on the German institutional and social system related to the high levels of migration, particularly since 2015.

In response to these long-term and mid-term challenges, AfD offers a scathing populist narrative of an out-of-touch and incompetent political elite juxtaposed to a radical right program of tough law-and-order policies against migrants and dual citizens, as well as economic liberalisation, and leaving the Eurozone. Concerns about the prospects for the implementation of this programme comes from the fact that the ongoing electoral campaign revolves around the extent the different parties would curb migration, as well as the controversial decision by the CDU/CSU to rely on support from the AfD for passing an anti-migration bill in January 2025. In doing so, the centre-right seemed to have broken the political cordon sanitaire around AfD and opened the doors for potential cooperation with the radical right in legislative and executive matters.

How realistic are these prospects? It is difficult to guess, especially given that these elections will be held under new electoral rules. One thing is certain - this will be a numbers game, depending on two key aspects: first, the size of the AfD parliamentary group - the larger it is, the higher its blackmail potential would be. Second, the level of fragmentation in parliament. Beyond the top four parties (CDU/CSU, AfD, SPD, Greens), polls indicate that the liberal FDP and the radical left BSW will not manage to enter the Bundestag, whereas Die Linke will. Should none of these three smaller parties enter parliament, the lower the AfD influence will be on government formation. But a potential entry of Die Linke and/or BSW may necessitate from the Christian democrats, social democrats, and Greens to seek a tri-partisan coalition government as their only option - something that will prove to be a difficult task, as the Bavarian centre-right CSU (the sister party of the CDU) indicated its unwillingness to share government responsibility with the Greens. Not to mention that so far the centre-right and the Greens in Germany had not been in a coalition government together.

One may be tempted to draw parallels to neighbouring Austria, which is in a similar situation. The country held its federal elections last year, which were won by the radical right FPÖ. The attempts of forming a coalition failed so far: first, a tripartisan broad coalition between Christian democrats, social democrats and liberals failed after the latter left the talks, followed by the Christian democrats terminating the negotiations with the social democrats. This opened the doors for coalition talks between FPÖ and the Christian democrats, which collapsed in mid-February over disagreements around portfolio allocation, leaving Austria in a difficult situation to resolve.

Is there room for a scenario where the CDU/CSU and AfD form a coalition government? The short answer is no. Of course, one should never say never, but currently it seems that the established parties in Germany remain open to seek a compromise between each other even when there is little room for it - something that the German post-war political system achieved on numerous occasions. Furthermore, Germany so far had not experienced a coalition between the centre-right and the radical right in contrast to the recent and more distant experiences of post-war Austria. Yet, the recent actions of CDU/CSU breaking off the political isolation around AfD at the national level makes such a coalition a bit more likely. Similarly, FPÖ is an established part of the Austrian party system, whereas the AfD and its current magnitude is a recent occurrence in German politics.

Regardless of the coalition constellation, the coming German government will inherit a number of challenges, associated with the effects of multiple crises faced by the country: high inflation rates, economic recession, energy shortages, war in Ukraine, tensions between the US and its European partners to name a few. If the government fails to address these adequately, then the likelihood of an AfD involvement in national government will increase.

Author

Dr Petar Bankov is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow. His research interests are in comparative party politics, particularly focused on the relations between political parties and citizens at the local level.

Preview photo by Claudio Schwarz on Unsplash

First published: 20 February 2025

<< News and insights