Kant and the Supposed Right of Necessity
Published: 22 March 2024
Jens Timmermann (St Andrews): 'Kant and the Supposed Right of Necessity', 18 October, 1-3pm
Law and Philosophy Seminar
18 October 2024
Halliday Room, Stair Building, 1st Floor (entry of either 8 or 5 professors’ square)
Jens Timmermann (University of St Andrews)
Kant and the Supposed Right of Necessity
Abstract: For Kant, it can never be right to take an innocent life. This includes traditional cases of necessity, i.e. cases in which we would need to take the life of another to preserve our own. The standard example is that of the ‘plank of Carneades’, which can be found in Cicero’s De officiis. When shipwrecked on the high seas, is it permissible to wrest a plank from the hands of someone who has already seized it? Kant’s answer in the introduction to the Doctrine of Right is negative. Surprisingly, however, he also tells us that this kind of wrong would not be punishable in a court of law. In this talk, I examine Kant’s argument and its implications within in their historical, philosophical and legal context.
First published: 22 March 2024