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Research title: New Directions in Responsible Inquiry
Patrizio, R. F. (2024) Testimonial liberalism and the balance of epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies, 181(11), pp. 2997-3015. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02244-1)
Patrizio, R. F. (2024) Trust’s Meno problem: can the doxastic view account for the value of trust? Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 18-37. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2206837)
Patrizio, R. F. (2024) Testimonial liberalism and the balance of epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies, 181(11), pp. 2997-3015. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02244-1)
Patrizio, R. F. (2024) Trust’s Meno problem: can the doxastic view account for the value of trust? Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 18-37. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2206837)
2021 AHRC SGSAH Doctoral Training Partnership Scholarship (full fees and stipend)
Co-founder of SEECRs (Scottish Epistemology Early Career Researchers)
Member of COGITO (Glasgow Epistemology Research Centre)
Women in Philosophy Mentor (2020-)
Organiser for Glasgow's Minorities and Philosophy Chapter (2021-)
Glasgow Philosophy Postgraduate Taught Representative (2019-2021)
