The Theory of Moral Sentiments
Adam Smith's first major published major work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, was heavily influenced by the lectures he gave at the University of Glasgow. It was first published in 1759.
In the book Smith lays out the wider context on which his later work, The Wealth of Nations, rests. Smith argued that economic behaviour does not exist within a vacuum and is heavily influenced by social and moral norms.
As Smith’s first major published major work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, was heavily influenced by the lectures he gave at the University of Glasgow in his role as Professor of Moral Philosophy. It was first published in 1759, though Smith made numerous revisions and further editions were published throughout his life.
Watch Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith lays out the wider context on which Wealth of Nations rests. Smith argued that economic behaviour does not exist within a vacuum and is heavily influenced by social and moral norms.
As many Enlightenment scholars before him, Smith sought to identify the source of our ability to form moral judgements. To put it simply, how we decide what is right, and what is wrong. Smith traced this to our sentiments and argued morality was influenced by the social nature of humans, namely our need for approval and desire for social cohesion. We wish to be viewed as morally responsible, so we behave in a socially acceptable way. Through experience we develop an understanding of what works and does not work, what people approve of and do not approve of, and are able to understand others’ positions (sympathy).
Sympathy
Sympathy is central to The Theory of Moral Sentiments and underpins his whole approach to how we connect to others in society.
Smith argues sympathy is derived by imagining how we might feel if we were exposed to the same circumstances as some other person. When we 'enter into' the feelings of others, we feel connected to their suffering and resent those who have caused it.
Smith acknowledges that factors can influence the extent of our sympathy, such as geographical distance and our relationship to the individual. The closer we feel to the individual, the more easily we can imagine their experience and respond accordingly. Those who live far away, are more difficult to relate to or understand, limiting our ability to sympathise.
The Impartial Spectator
Smith’s 'Impartial Spectator' describes an imaginary witness to our actions, whose objective judgement encourages us to adjust our behaviour and act morally.
The Impartial Spectator is our own conscience, who is guiding our actions and encouraging us to adopt morally acceptable behaviour. Our Impartial Spectator, when combined for our desire for social cohesion, shapes the rules or 'virtues' by which we live our lives.
Among those virtues are prudence, justice, beneficence, and self-command.
Virtues
Prudence is the inherent tendency present in humans to look after ourselves and our own self-interests.
Justice is essential for the survival of society, as it acts to limit the harm which we can impose upon others.
Beneficence (or doing good) are the actions we take to improve upon the situation of others. The presence of beneficence improves society as a whole, by promoting the wellbeing of others through our compassion.
Self-command is our capacity to recognise and control the passions which govern our actions, moral or otherwise.